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Public press and companies have increasingly strong interests in the impact on 
businesses brought about by virtual communities.  In recent years, virtual communities 
have become significant sources of information for consumers and businesses by offering 
unprecedented opportunities for information sharing.  Scholars recognize that 
information posted in virtual communities has important implications for the behaviors of 
community members and subsequent economic decisions and market performance.  
However, relatively less is explored about how the informational value of virtual 
communities results from an aggregated or fragmented community of information.  In 
particular, the underlying motives and mechanisms of user interactions in virtual 
communities are challenging to understand because of the amount of information 
 viii
available and the potential noises.  To investigate user dynamics and the resulting 
informational value in virtual communities, I explore three major issues in my 
dissertation.  First, I empirically examine whether community fragmentation or 
aggregation prevails in the context of virtual investment communities.  Results indicate 
that instead of the common belief of virtual communities serving as melting pots that 
comprise opinions, online investors, in particular, show strong homophily behavior in 
virtual investment communities.  Second, using data from virtual investment 
communities, I investigate the interactions among online investors that drive homophily 
and community fragmentation.  I find that psychological needs for supportive opinions 
mainly drive the information seeking and interaction behaviors of online investors as 
compared to economic rationales.  Following this line of exploration, I also identify the 
informational impact of virtual communities on user behaviors in the context of 
electronic markets.  With data from online retailers, I examine the possible shrinkage of 
consumer product consideration that is reinforced by online recommendations.  A 
resultant change of consumer consideration leads to a landscape shift of product 
competition for online retailers, suggesting strategic implications to manufacturers.  All 
in all, my dissertation contributes to an understanding of the value of virtual communities 
as informational media, how virtual communities shape online user opinions, and how 
online user preferences impact businesses and markets in a networked economy.  My 
research pushes the frontier toward understanding virtual communities and sheds light on 
the insights into exploring online network dynamics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
In recent years, explosive growth of virtual communities is shown to significantly 
impact human behavior in terms of social networking.  There are various reasons for 
which users join virtual communities.  A large number of people jump into virtual 
communities to seek and share information.  For instance, online investors browse daily 
financial news sites, join message board discussions, and exchange stock investment tips 
on Yahoo! Finance; movie viewers share opinions and comments on Netflix.com; 
healthcare professionals provide institutional and physician-related knowledge to patients 
on HealthBoards.com. 
In addition to information support, virtual communities offer an unprecedented 
platform for building social relationships.  Two of the most well-known examples of 
online social-networking communities include MySpace.com and Facebook.com, which 
link friends, and even strangers, in virtual worlds to share interests and activities or to 
explore the interests and activities of others.  In virtual communities such as electronic 
marketplaces (e.g. Amazon.com and eBay.com), people join virtual communities to 
perform more efficient and profitable transactions.  There are also a large number of 
people who participate in virtual communities for fantasy and fun.  For example, 
Battle.net is famous for its virtual multi-player gaming environment for networked and 
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interactive entertainment.  In addition, Xbox Live provides an integrated entertainment 
service for MSNBC, MSN Portal, Xbox gaming, etc.  ESPN.com, ranked the worldwide 
leader in sports, provides a “Fantasy Sports” service to its audience for simulated gaming 
based on live scoring and player performance. 
A great deal of evidence shows that the drastic progression and lapse in social 
dynamics from traditional networking experience brought on by virtual communities has 
significant impacts on subsequent economic decisions and businesses.  Procter & 
Gamble (P&G) reports a 40% gain on research productivity after tapping into virtual 
communities (P&G Report 2007).  This demonstrates the monetary value and prosperity 
of virtual communities.  Further, MySpace.com and its parent company, Intermix Media 
sold for $580 million because of the potential for revenue growth for advertiser 
companies through its information sharing abilities (USA Today 2006).  Stanford GSB 
News (2007; Nair et al. 2006) shows that pharmaceutical companies decide to spend 
approximately 32% of their total marketing dollars to influence opinion leaders (e.g. 
healthcare professionals, physicians, etc.), which will be rapidly disseminated among 
online medicine-related forums.  In addition, Facebook.com obtained a $240 million 
investment from Microsoft in October 2007 for its unique audience growth by 1.5 million 
people in that month (Fortune 2007).  Amazon.com, the largest online retailer, continued 
its upward trend in revenue growth in the first quarter of 2008, posting a 37% increase in 
revenue and 30% growth in earnings for the period (Portfolio.com 2008).  Finally, Xbox 
expects combined revenue of $726 million from its TV and movie services by 2011 
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(Emerging Media Dynamics Executive Reports 2006). 
The skyrocketing success of businesses as a result of virtual communities has 
drawn great attention not only from the public press and practice, but also from academia.  
In particular, researchers are becoming more and more interested in underlying user 
behaviors and the interaction dynamics that have created the value of virtual communities, 
which lead to the foresight of the potential impacts on businesses.  Extant studies are the 
inspiration for this dissertation: to add to academia’s current understanding of virtual 
communities by unraveling the underlying dynamics of interaction behavior in virtual 
communities.  Specifically, I investigate what motives drive online users to seek and 
exchange information and what the consequence are for the informational value derived 
from such behavior in virtual communities.  Examination of these issues is presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  The value of virtual communities based on information sharing 
tightly ties in with the third area in my study, which is given in Chapter 4.  In sum, the 
present study in Chapter 4 is concerned with the managerial implications of user 
interactions and consumption in virtual communities.  A detailed conceptual description 
of my dissertation is given in the following subsection. 
 
1.2 Conceptual Overview 
The first section in Chapter 2 of my dissertation investigates the informational 
value of virtual communities that results from user interactions.  While it is commonly 
believed that virtual communities serve as “melting pots” of opinions and thoughts, there 
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is little empirical evidence or a consistent theoretical basis for this assumption.  
Therefore, I examine whether a “melting-pot” or “homophily” of online individual 
opinions in fact prevails in virtual communities, particularly in the context of virtual 
investment communities. 
To do so, I mainly draw upon literature that includes bounded rationality (e.g. 
Simon 1957), information economics for information acquisition (e.g. Stigler 1961), and 
homophily in social networks (e.g. McPherson et al. 2001) to investigate information 
seeking and interactions among online investors.  I conduct an empirical investigation 
using stock investment sentiments of 72,019 online investors on 29 Yahoo! Finance stock 
message boards.  The objective is to examine whether individuals have a stronger 
tendency to interact with like-minded people, as is homophily, or whether they are more 
likely to seek dissimilar interests and information, which indicates the melting pot idea.  
I find that, instead of information aggregation as might be expected from online networks, 
online investors reveal strong tendencies toward homophily due to psychological needs in 
virtual investment communities. 
The mechanisms that drive homophily in virtual investment communities are then 
further explored in my second essay in Chapter 3.  In particular, I examine the 
underlying factors that influence user interactions for homophily.  My study draws 
heavily upon the psychological biases of online investors (e.g. Barber and Odean 2001a 
& 2001b; Kahneman and Tversky 1996).  In addition, several major streams of literature 
are presented to provide insights into user interactions in virtual communities, as briefed 
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below. 
Prior work investigates the incentives of individuals to participate in virtual 
communities—largely corresponding to the different purposes for which people join 
virtual communities in reality as mentioned above, such as searching for knowledge, 
building relationships, verifying identities, seeking emotional support, etc. (e.g. Butler 
2001; Dholakia et al. 2004).  Participation activities further reinforce some key issues 
for maintaining and creating the sustainability and competitiveness of virtual 
communities, including, for example, the appropriate membership size (e.g. Butler 2001) 
and online trust and reputation (e.g. Dellarocas 2003). 
With the Yahoo! Finance data presented in Chapter 2, I use a discrete choice 
model to empirically examine the economic rationales and psychological needs that drive 
online investors to choose to participate in online discussion groups.  I find that 
individuals’ incentives in exchanging information with like-minded people are heavily 
affected by the nature of virtual investment communities and individual statuses.  
Specifically, availability of thread choices, increase in stock volatility and holding 
minority opinion are associated with homophily behavior, while membership size of 
discussion threads determines whether homophily or heterophily behavior occurs.  I 
show that the first three results are consistent with psychological needs that drive 
homophily and the last result indicates interaction between economic and homophily 
behavior.  The study shows the interactions of online investors are mostly motivated by 
homophily behavior due to psychological needs instead of economic concerns. 
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The interaction dynamics of information sharing and exchange among online 
users creates “word-of-mouth” activities, which are shown to have significant impacts on 
subsequent economic behaviors, such as purchase and investment decisions (e.g. 
Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Dellarocas et al. 2008; Duan et al. 2008).  The third 
section in Chapter 4 offers an investigation of how information provided by virtual 
communities alters human behaviors, which in turn affects managerial strategies for 
businesses.  Specifically, while much has been discussed that the Long Tail increases 
product variety in online retailers, prior work shows it could be the other way around.  
With the presence and reinforcement of online recommendations, product variety could, 
in contrast, decrease.  Further, product alternatives considered by consumers for 
purchase decisions may become fewer.  This possible shrinkage of consideration set of 
product alternatives has significant implications for product competition.  In particular, 
from the perspective of manufactures, products need to not only compete for being 
purchased but also being first included in consideration by consumers.  In this study, I 
show that in real online retailing environments, the size of consideration set is fairly 
small.  I then investigate the resultant product competition for consideration and for 
choice by developing a consideration set choice model at the aggregate level.  The 
model is applied to 38,400 unique products collected from Amazon’s “What Do 
Customers Ultimately Buy After Viewing This Item?.”  The results show that despite the 
high level of product variety provided by online retailers, more than half (53.294%) of 
the purchase decisions are made by consumers considering two or fewer product 
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alternatives.  In addition, the two levels of product competition are distinctive from each 
other: a product does well for consideration may not do so well for purchase choice, and 
vice versa.  This study brings out two key implications.  First, the results reveal that 
due to the small size of consideration set, being first considered by online consumers 
plays a dominant role in product competition.  Second, the findings indicate that pricing 
strategies only influence product competition for choice.  It suggests that despite 
overwhelming focus on price competition in prior work, it plays a rather limited role in 
product competition for consideration. 
 
1.3 Contributions 
My dissertation has three main contributions.  First, I empirically demonstrate 
that versus economic rationales, online investors are driven principally by cognitive and 
psychological biases to interact in virtual investment communities.  Thus, this 
dissertation is one of the first attempts to study individual interaction behavior in virtual 
communities and identifies the informational value of virtual investment communities.  
The community fragmentation and homophily explored in virtual investment 
communities shows how interactions in virtual investment communities affect user 
opinions and their subsequent economic decisions. 
Second, the informational value of virtual investment communities suggests a 
number of insights for practitioners, such as virtual community providers and businesses 
that are interested in understanding the distribution of information and value of 
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advertising to virtual community members.  For instance, virtual community members 
can be clustered based on their tendencies to expressing opinions, which is valuable 
information for marketing and pricing strategies.  Incentives can also be provided to 
online members to encourage them to express opinions, which may foster diversity in 
virtual communities if desired. 
Third, the investigation of product competition that results from consumer 
consideration and product choices that are suggested by online recommendations further 
explores the informational value of virtual communities for business practitioners.  The 
findings of differentiated product competition for consumer consideration and choice in 
online retailers are insightful for product manufacturers.  For instance, instead of pricing 
and product quality considerations, enhancing product awareness plays a more dominant 
role in a marketer’s ability to increase product competitiveness in virtual communities. 
In brief, exploring the issues in my dissertation advances the present 
understanding of the value of virtual communities as informational media and how they 
shape user opinions and economic impacts in today’s networked economy.  In the 
following chapters, I present detailed research for each of the topics of my dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Melting-Pot or Homophily in Virtual Investment 
Communities?—An Empirical Investigation 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There is significant excitement in the popular press on the role of virtual 
communities in creating business value.  BusinessWeek’s cover story on June 20, 2005, 
noted that “companies are using Internet-powered services [virtual communities] to tap 
into the collective intelligence of employees, customers, and outsiders, transforming their 
internal operations” (Hop 2005).  The results are astounding: P&G reports a 40% gain 
on research productivity after tapping into virtual communities like MySpace.com (P&G 
report 2007).  This potential has resulted in staggering evaluation of some virtual 
communities like MySpace.com (USA Today 2006).  For example, News Corp acquired 
MySpace.com and its parent Intermix Media for $580 million and Microsoft gained 2.5% 
interest in Facebook.com for $250 million. 
Virtual communities vary significantly in terms of compositions and topics.  On 
one end individuals with prior ties come together to interact socially to the other end 
where complete strangers come together to discuss and share opinions and experience on 
a wide range of issues.  These issues include politics, religion, culture, healthcare, 
entertainment, real estate, retail, auction, technology, financial markets, or purchasing 
decisions.  Recent research shows that virtual communities for product/service 
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recommendations on websites like Amazon.com or tripadvisor.com1 have significant 
impact on consumer purchase decisions and welfare (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; 
Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Li and Hitt 2007).  Likewise, Ma and Agarwal (2007) suggest 
that loyal automobile owners discover new ways of exploring automobile features on 
discussion boards. 
Early empirical evidences suggest that individuals are influenced by information 
posted on virtual communities.  However, research to explicate the nature and dynamics 
that underlie the information generation process is still evolving.  In this study, I 
recognize that virtual communities are, foremost, a venue for individual interactions.  
The interactions generate information that benefits all visitors to virtual communities 
even if they do not participate in the interactions.  Theoretical principles from economic 
and homophily perspectives can explain interaction behavior, but may offer contradictory 
views of how individuals choose to interact with each other.  Extant economic theory 
suggests that rational decision makers will seek out others with information they do not 
possess to improve decision making, thereby more information aggregation and 
potentially higher social welfare are created (Feltham and Demski 1970).  That is, as 
often claimed in popular press, virtual communities serve as a melting pot of ideas and 
opinions and individuals come together to share and discuss various viewpoints to arrive 
at meaningful inferences. 
Homophily studies, on the contrary, indicates that individuals prefer to associate 
                                                 
1 ComScore Media Metrix reports that there were 15 million opinions posted on Tripadvisor.com in 2007. 
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with like-minded people, leading to community fragmentation and potentially lower 
social welfare (Hall et al. 2007; McPherson et al. 2001).  Community fragmentation is a 
situation in which individuals sharing common opinions come together while shunning 
individuals with different opinions.  That is, community is partitioned into virtual 
knowledge spaces.  Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (2005) provide analytical results to 
suggest community fragmentation or balkanization due to bounded rationality (Simon 
1957).  Since excessive information leads to higher information processing costs, 
community members may be more selective in interacting with others (e.g. Butler 2001; 
Gu et al. 2007; Whittaker et al. 1998).  Further, individuals may only interact with 
people of similar opinions to reinforce their own beliefs rather than assimilating different 
viewpoints (Gilovich 1991).  In addition, such selective interactions are amplified on 
virtual communities through automatic filters, ignoring lists, collaboration 
recommendations, and other web technologies.  Therefore, virtual communities do not 
necessarily assimilate information.  Instead, they could foster fragmented and biased 
interactions that polarize the communities. 
This study addresses the gap in our understanding between the two competing 
theoretical lenses with contradicting outcomes.  In particular, in this research I develop 
models of behavior under different theoretical anchoring and provide empirical validation 
to better understand the behaviors. 
I study observed individual interactions in virtual financial investment 
communities.  Financial investment communities such as Yahoo! Finance, MSN Money, 
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and AOL Money & Finance attracted over 62 million unique visitors in February 2008 
(Media Metrix 2008).  Investors interact with each other to exchange stock tips, 
investment strategies and rumors.  The large number of unique participants and postings 
raises a number of interesting questions on how investors choose to interact with others.  
It is also relevant to policy makers and market efficiency since the interaction determines 
the speed of information (e.g. rumors) to spread and influence trading decisions. 
Virtual investment communities provide several advantages to study behaviors.  
For most virtual community contexts, individuals’ beliefs and opinions are usually high 
dimensional and difficult to observe.  However, in virtual investment communities, the 
beliefs are of one dimension, providing an effective avenue towards measuring online 
investors’ beliefs.  Second, unlike in many virtual communities, an individual’s belief on 
stock performance, i.e. the information signal and strength to buy or sell a certain stock, 
is verifiable from his/her self-declared sentiment about a stock.  That is, investors rate 
whether they are bullish (i.e. buy or strong buy), bearish (i.e. sell or strong sell), or 
neutral.  This avoids mining of noisy texts to understand investor opinions.  Third, 
investing activity has rich literature in using both economic and psychological theories to 
understand investor behavior. 
I collected 17,329 discussion threads within which a total of 72,019 individual 
postings are considered, from 29 stock message boards for a three-year period from 
January 2004 to December 2006.  Virtual investment communities use discussion 
threads to facilitate interaction among members.  My results find that, despite the 
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prediction of information economics theory that suggests that rational investors seek 
others with different information to increase expected utility, online investors are more 
inclined to interact with like-minded people, reflecting cognitive biases and homophily 
behavior.  I argue that investors seek others to reinforce their beliefs and enhance 
psychological biases such as illusion of control and illusion of knowledge (Burger 1989; 
Deci and Ryan 1987; Langer 1975).  This behavior creates fragmented communities 
instead of a unified, informed village. 
This research makes three unique contributions.  First, this study provides 
empirical evidence to verify that online investors are mainly motivated to interact with 
others from cognitive biases and psychological needs rather than economic rationales, in 
support of homophily studies.  To the best of our knowledge, this has not been studied 
empirically in the literature.  Second, this study addresses the important issue of the 
informational value of virtual communities for practice and businesses.  The 
demonstration of homophily behavior in virtual communities provides insights into the 
power of word of mouth and managerial implications such as community member 
segments based on their opinion profiles.  Third, I develop a methodology to construct 
an online investor’s information set for stock investments, and to assess similarity of 
information sets between investors that interact with each other.  The methodology also 
suggests an information economic view of how individuals seek online postings to 
increase their expected utilities.  This has important implications for research in virtual 
investment communities. 
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 2.2, I present 
literature review.  Theories and hypotheses for community fragmentation or aggregation 
are discussed in Section 2.3.  In Section 2.4, I present data followed by methodology in 
Section 2.5.  Empirical analysis and discussions are given in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
There are four major bodies of literature relevant to this study: bounded 
rationality (Simon 1957), economic rationale for information seeking (e.g. Stigler 1961), 
homophily in social networks (e.g. Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; McPherson et al. 2001), 
and psychological biases such as illusion of control, illusion of knowledge, and 
overconfidence (e.g. Langer 1975; Barber and Odean 2001a; Kahneman and Tversky 
1996; Konana and Balasubramanian 2005). 
Bounded rationality (Simon 1957), arising from critical psychological limits to 
process all information, is one of the major theoretical arguments to explain how 
individuals seek information and participate in virtual communities.  Individuals with 
bounded rationality are likely to filter out information for more focused attention 
(Broadbent 1958), and become selective in their participation and information seeking 
behavior (DeMarzo et al. 2003).  Further, a large amount of information creates 
information overload, a situation in which an individual fails to process and utilize all 
information (Rogers and Agarwala-Rogers 1975).  These arguments have been used to 
describe virtual community participation.  Bounded rationality impacts online network 
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formation by requiring community members to make trade-offs between information 
quantity and quality (Gu et al. 2007).  Information overload drives users to have a 
tendency to only attend to simpler messages, end active participation, and generate 
simpler responses (Jones et al. 2004).  Further, users may self-select to online groups 
based on knowledge and interests because of bounded rationality, leading to 
cyber-Balkans in electronic communities (Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 2005). 
Economic theories view information seeking from a cost-benefit perspective 
(Demski 1967); the benefit of acquiring an additional piece of information depends on its 
value of increasing one’s utility (Birchler and Bütler 2007).  Thus, economically rational 
individuals will seek out different information to improve decision making (Feltham and 
Demski 1970).  This body of literature suggests that individuals will search for 
dissimilar opinions from virtual communities to lower uncertainty and maximize utility. 
The human interaction and information seeking behavior, however, can also be 
examined through another lens from social science and social psychology literature.  
Homophily, first coined by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), suggests that individuals tend 
to associate with others who share similar backgrounds or beliefs, often referred to as 
“similarity breeds connection” (McPherson et al. 2001).  Literature suggests that 
homophilous behavior occurs frequently based on status including socio-demographic 
factors, or value such as sentiments, beliefs and values (Rogers and Bhowmik 1971; 
McPherson et al. 2001).  Homophily studies are mainly reasoned by social 
psychological theories, including self-categorization (Yuan and Gay 2006), reinforcement 
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theory or law of attraction (Macy et al. 2003), and social comparison theory (McPherson 
et al. 2001).  Specifically, social comparison theory (Festinger 1950) and 
self-categorization (Turner et al. 1987) support that people may use a reference group of 
those who are similar to themselves to self-identify and form homophily.  Further, 
people will seek out confirmatory information to be rewarded more based on 
reinforcement theory (Baumeister and Bushman 2007).  This body of literature argues 
that homophily behavior may transfer even in virtual space without any prior ties. 
This research also relies on the psychological biases of individuals particularly in 
the context of online investors.  Online investors demonstrate multiple psychological 
biases that distort decision making and economic outcomes (Barber and Odean 2001a & 
2001b).  In particular, online investors present illusion of control (Langer 1975), which 
results when people inappropriately estimate their ability to control events, when, in fact, 
some events are not controllable.  People with illusion of control alter their process of 
seeking and obtaining realms of information, leading to “illusion of knowledge,” and 
believe that they are more knowledgeable than they really are (Burger 1989; Deci and 
Ryan 1987).  Investors are also often biased by overconfidence (Barber and Odean 
2001a), especially when they are less experienced yet successful, and thus will hold 
stronger beliefs in their ability and evaluation in beating markets.  These psychological 
biases impact how individuals seek information in virtual communities (Konana and 
Balasubramanian 2005). 
The recent studies indicate that information from virtual communities is likely to 
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influence individuals in many different contexts.  Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson (2005) 
specifically provide analytical support for Balkanization in virtual communities.  
However, these studies do not empirically suggest if individuals show homophily 
behavior.  My research provides further insights into virtual community dynamics and 
adds to the literature. 
 
2.3 Theories and Hypotheses 
Whether community fragmentation or information aggregation prevails in virtual 
investment communities is resulted from individual information seeking and interactions.  
Two competing theories argue how individuals seek information and interact with each 
other.  Information economics suggests that people will search for information they do 
not possess to lower uncertainty and increase utility.  Psychological perspective, on the 
contrary, indicates that individuals are driven by cognitive biases to seek confirmatory 
information to reinforce their original beliefs. 
 
2.3.1 Information Economics Perspective 
Information economics considers that the main objective of interactions with 
others is to obtain information, and information seeking is viewed from a cost-benefit 
perspective (Demski 1967).  The benefit of acquiring an additional piece of information 
depends on its value of increasing one’s utility (Birchler and Bütler 2007).  Thus, 
economically rational individuals will seek out information that lowers uncertainty, 
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maximizes utility, and improves decision making (Feltham and Demski 1970).  In the 
context of virtual investment communities, if an online investor is economically rational, 
then when he/she observes a posted message with a sentiment, information economics 
suggests the following investment decisions: 
 
a. Invest based on his/her own sentiment if it is the same as the message 
sentiment. 
b. Invest based on his/her own sentiment if it is different from the 
message sentiment, but the latter is weaker. 
c. Invest against his/her own sentiment if it is different from the message 
sentiment, and the latter is stronger. 
 
The above decisions indicate that when the sentiments of the investor and the 
message are the same, there is no value for the investor to further identify whether the 
message sentiment is weaker or stronger.  However, when the sentiments are different, 
the investor will explore the strength of the message sentiment by, for example, clicking 
on the posted message and reading it through.  Therefore, economic motivation suggests 
that individuals have more incentives in exploring messages which sentiments contradict 
their beliefs to improve the quality of decision making.  (For a more detailed illustration, 
please see Appendix 2.1 for Chapter 2.)  This behavior potentially makes virtual 
communities melting pots of beliefs. 
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2.3.2 Homophily and Psychological Perspective 
Psychological perspective argues that information seeking behavior is heavily 
influenced by psychological factors and cognitive biases.  One of the most well-known 
cognitive biases of information seeking is anchoring and judgment, i.e. decision makers 
are likely to rely too heavily on a small set of information when making decisions 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  Specifically, anchoring states that during decision 
making, individuals tend to anchor on specific information and then adjust their decisions 
accordingly.  Once the anchor is set, individuals demonstrate a bias towards that value. 
A particular anchoring bias arises in virtual investment communities when an 
online investor participates in online discussions with a priori self belief in stock 
investment.  This self belief can serves as an anchor from which later sentiments in 
stock investment are made.  Online investors then anchor on the self belief as a starting 
point and make adjustments towards that sentiment.  For instance, if the self sentiment 
leans towards “buying a certain stock,” anchoring bias drives the online investor to have 
higher evaluation of postings with similar sentiments and lower evaluation of those with 
opposite sentiments. 
The tendency to anchor on self beliefs is due to the psychological biases that 
online investors are commonly shown to bear (Barber and Odean 2001a & 
2001b)—illusion of control (Langer 1975) and illusion of knowledge (Burger 1989; Deci 
and Ryan 1987).  Illusion of control results when people have the bias in estimating that 
the events are controllable by their ability where in fact they are not.  This illusion is 
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further related to the process of seeking and obtaining realms of information of online 
investors and thus leads to illusion of knowledge.  People with illusion of knowledge 
believe that they are more knowledgeable than they really are and become overconfident 
in beating markets (Barber and Odean 2001a).  Illusion of control, illusion of knowledge 
and overconfidence drive online investors to not only anchor on specific information, but 
particularly on self beliefs to reinforce their original sentiments. 
The psychological biases of online investors in associating with similar others 
lead to the homophily behavior (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954).  Instead of status 
homophily based on gender, race, etc. widely discussed in physical social networks (e.g. 
McPherson et al. 2001), online investors form value homophily based on opinions, 
beliefs, etc. in virtual investment communities.  This tendency of interacting with 
like-minded people leads to a community fragmentation. 
Note that the information seeking and interaction behavior in virtual investment 
communities is not completely accessible.  That is, while we can easily figure out who 
have posted what messages online, people who have “viewed and read” those messages 
are rather unobservable.  Therefore, in this study I limit the information seeking, 
interaction, and participation behavior only in the more clearly-defined range of posting 
activities.  This behavior can then be assessed by observing individual choices to post 
messages after reading other messages in online discussion threads. 
Based on the arguments above, when individuals are driven by psychological and 
cognitive biases, they tend to post messages in discussion threads in which like-minded 
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others express supportive opinions.  On the flip side, when individuals are influenced by 
information economics rationales, they are more likely to participate in discussion threads 
in which messages with dissimilar sentiments are shown.  I used the term “opinion 
distance” to represent the similarity between the individual belief and the aggregated 
opinion from a discussion thread.  Specifically, opinion distance defines the extent to 
which an individual’s opinion is aligned with the average sentiment across all messages 
in a certain discussion thread.  A large opinion distance indicates that the investor’s 
opinion is dissimilar as the average thread opinion.  A small opinion distance, on the 
other hand, refers to that the two compared opinions are confirmatory.  To investigate 
which of the two competing theories actually holds in virtual investment communities, I 
propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1A (homophily and cognitive biases).  For a discussion thread, as opinion 
distance increases, an investor’s probability of posting in this particular thread 
decreases. 
Hypothesis 1B (information economics rationale).  For a discussion thread, as opinion 
distance increases, an investor’s probability of posting in this particular thread increases. 
 
The two hypotheses state that individual choice of discussion thread participation 
leads to either community fragmentation or information aggregation in virtual investment 
communities.  This choice behavior is further moderated by the nature of virtual 
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investment communities and individual statuses, as suggested by previous research, 
which will be detailed in the next chapter.  In the following, I first present data, 
methodology and empirical analysis to examine community fragmentation or aggregation 
in virtual communities. 
 
2.4 Data 
I conduct this study in virtual investment communities.  These communities, 
such as Yahoo! Finance, Silicon Investor, etc, provide a venue where online investors 
voluntarily interact with each other to share investing-related information.  Virtual 
investment communities are presented in the form of stock message boards, or stock 
forums.  Each stock message board covers one stock and individual investors interact 
with one another by reading and posting online messages in the message boards.  Most 
of the messages in virtual investment communities are the results of a series of 
interactions among investors on a particular topic.  These interactions form discussion 
threads are shown in Figure 2.1.  In a discussion thread, the posted messages present the 
information that online investors seek, process, and get involved, and by repeatedly 
interacting with each other, investors find out more details of online postings that help 
them make investment decisions. 
In this study, I collect stock message board messages from Yahoo! Finance, one of 
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the leading stock investment communities.  The data include a sample of 292 Dow 
Jones stocks during a 36-month span from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2006.  The 
29 stocks are all large companies, but with various risk levels (beta values), and these 
stocks are of significant interests of online investors.  In each message, investors can not 
only express their opinion in the message body but also through sentiment labels.  In 
Yahoo! Finance stock message boards, sentiments express investor opinions in five 
categories: Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Sell, and Strong Sell.  These five categories are 
coded ranging from -2 (Strong Sell) to 2 (Strong Buy), as shown in Figure 2.2.  Not all 
users provide sentiment labels in their messages though.  Two approaches have been 
used in prior studies to address missing sentiments for these messages.  Researchers 
either use text-mining approach to estimate sentiments (Antweiler and Frank 2004; Das 
and Chen 2001) or ignore these messages without sentiments all together.  It is noted 
that the accuracy of text-mining approach is quite low.  To avoid the influence of noises 
due to text-mining, I choose the second approach by removing all messages without 
sentiments for the analysis. 
The following attributes are acquired for each message: thread ID, message ID, 
thread topic, author ID, posting date and time, message content, and sentiment assigned 
along with every message.  Table 2.1 shows the summary of descriptive statistics of the 
discussion threads of 29 stock message boards in Yahoo! Finance community. 
                                                 
2 We started tracking virtual investment communities for the 30 Dow Jones stocks on January 1, 2004.  
We kept tracking the same set of 30 stocks even though the components of Dow Jones Index changes.  In 
November 2005, two of the 30 companies (AT&T and SBC) merged, leaving only 29 stocks for this study. 
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2.5 Methodology 
To provide an initial indication of community fragmentation, I compare 
inter-thread variation against intra-thread variation in investor sentiments within a certain 
stock message board on a given day.  For a stock message board s on a given day d, 
suppose there are sdN unique threads, and in each thread i, there are in messages in this 
thread.  For each thread i, let iX be the average of the sentiments of all messages in 
thread i, ijX be the sentiment value of message j in thread i, and X be the average of the 
sentiments of all messages on this given day.  The inter-thread variation of stock 
message board s on day d is computed as 
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I thus define community fragmentation as the ratio of inter-thread variation to 
intra-thread variation of stock message board s on a given day d, that is, 
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The fragmentation analysis is conducted on a daily basis due to the nature of stock 
market—the stock market operates every weekday, and related events and news are 
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released accordingly, which affect investor sentiments in stock investment.  If online 
investors interact randomly, we should expect intra-thread variation to be the same as 
inter-thread variation, and community fragmentation in Equation (2.3) is 1.  If online 
investors prefer interacting with others of different views as predicted by information 
economics, we expect intra-thread variation to be larger than inter-thread variation, and 
community fragmentation is less than 1.  On the other hand, if online investors prefer 
interacting like-minded people based on cognitive biases and psychological needs, we 
expect intra-thread variation to be smaller than inter-thread variation, and community 
fragmentation is greater than 1. 
In addition to investigating the extent of community fragmentation at the 
aggregate level, I take one step further to identify fragmentation resulted from the 
individual level.  To do so, I adopt a discrete choice model to analyze individual 
selection of discussion threads.  I consider an investor arriving at a stock message board 
and observing a list of discussion threads, and analyze how the investor chooses among 
these discussion threads. 
To apply the discrete choice model, we need to define the choice set for each 
investor at each choice decision.  Since virtual investment communities present threads 
in reverse chronicle order, I define the choice set as the 10 most recent unique discussion 
threads that investor i will see as soon as he/she arrives at the stock message board.  I 
use 10 as the number of the elements in the choice set due to the fact that every time an 
investor visits a stock message board in Yahoo! Finance, 20 discussion threads will be 
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presented on the web page, and with just one scrolling-down, about 10 discussion threads 
are listed.  Given the choice set, online investors evaluate each discussion thread in the 
set and then choose the one with the highest evaluation.  I use the multinomial logit 
(MNL) framework to model the choice process.  Specifically, the probability that 
discussion thread k is chosen by investor i, given choice set C of 10 most recent unique 
discussion threads, is 
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if thread k is in choice set C and zero otherwise.  ikX  indicate the discussion 
thread-related mix variables, which I will explain below. 
The main effect of individual choice of discussion threads on community 
fragmentation or aggregation under consideration is opinion distance.  The opinion 
distance between investor i and each choice of discussion thread k is computed as the 
absolute difference of investor i’s sentiment value and the average sentiment value of all 
messages in thread k.  Notice here we use the average sentiment value of all messages in 
thread k due to the assumption that an investor will not post in a thread until he/she reads 
through all messages posted in this certain thread. 
To examine the effect of opinion distance on individual choice, the following 
variables are controlled: the number of threads, the number of participants in a thread, 
stock volatility, thread position, and thread life span.  First, for a thread choice, the 
number of thread is the number of concurrent unique threads in a certain stock message 
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board that have occurred within one-hour frame prior to the first message time of this 
thread choice.  Second, the number of participants within a thread choice is calculated as 
the total number of unique users in this thread.  Stock volatility is retrieved from the 
monthly historical stock volatility data downloaded from Chicago Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE).  Two more thread-related variables should also be considered.  
Thread position indicates the positions of the threads in reverse chronicle order when an 
investor arrives at the message board.  Life span of a thread choice is the time (in minute) 
elapsed since the first message posting time until an investor makes the thread choice.  
More details of the variables can be found in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3, in which the 
driving factors of online investor interactions and homophily behavior are examined at 
the individual level in virtual investment communities. 
 
2.6 Empirical Analysis and Discussions 
Table 2.2 first presents the average community fragmentation measure for each of 
29 stock message boards at the aggregate level.  The result shows that intra-thread 
variation is significantly smaller than inter-thread variation.  This implies that online 
investors prefer interacting with like-minded others, indicating investors’ behavior is 
more driven by cognitive biases and psychological needs.  The finding aligns with the 
behavioral investigation of online investors in finance literature. 
The Yahoo! Finance stock message data contains a total of 720,190 (=72,019×10) 
unique decision points across the 29 stock message boards.  These decision points refer 
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to individuals making choices in participating in one of 10 discussion threads.  I present 
the effect of opinion distance on individual choice of discussion participation in Table 2.3.  
The opinion distance estimate shows that Hypothesis 1A is supported (β=-0.4453).  
Based on average partial effects (APEs) calculation (Wooldridge 2001, p. 471), for a 
discussion thread, each unit increase in the opinion distance, on average, partially reduces 
the probability that this particular thread being chosen by 1.71%.  That is, the greater the 
opinion distance between the investor and the discussion thread, the less likely he/she is 
to select this thread.  This result echoes the community fragmentation analysis, in which 
investors are motivated by cognitive biases and psychological needs when seeking and 
exchanging information.  The results also indicate that the controlled number of 
concurrent threads, thread position, and thread life span have significantly negative 
effects on individual choice of discussion threads, while the number of participants in a 
thread shows significantly positive effect.  The stock volatility does not have any direct 
effect on individual choice of thread. 
The results of this study provide initial empirical validation to previous literature 
on homophily and on community fragmentation (McPherson et al. 2001; Van Alstyne and 
Brynjolfsson 2005).  An understanding of this research issue is important for both 
theory and practice.  Realizing community fragmentation serves as the first avenue 
towards understanding how online users obtain information from virtual communities.  
In the next chapter, I take one step further into exploring the underlying interaction 
motives and mechanisms that drive this community fragmentation and homophily 
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behavior.  Specifically, unraveling the factors that drive individual choice of discussion 
threads sheds lights on how the interactions in virtual investment communities impact 
user opinions and alter their economic decisions. 
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Chapter 3: Causes of Homophily: Individual Choice and User 
Interactions in Virtual Investment Communities 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, it is shown that community fragmentation and homophily behavior, 
instead of a melting pot of opinions, prevail in virtual investment communities.  
Community fragmentation is resulted from individual interactions and choice of 
discussion threads.  Therefore, it is necessary to unravel the mechanisms of individual 
choice of participation in virtual discussions to fully understand the cause of homophily 
behavior and community fragmentation.  We note that a deal of prior work has studied 
user behaviors in various contexts of virtual communities, such as online investors (e.g. 
Barber and Odean 2001b & 2002; Konana and Balasubramanian 2005) and online 
consumers (e.g. Li and Hitt 2007).  However, the link between how online investors 
behave and thus self-select to participate in online discussions that drive homophily is 
still missing.  This study, therefore, is one of the first attempts to bridge this gap. 
An extensive collection of literature has argued that information overload (e.g. 
Jones et al. 2004), the existence of uncertainty (e.g. Zhang 2006), and membership size 
(e.g. Butler 2001) will significantly moderate the information seeking and interaction 
behavior.  Based on the rationales and data in Chapter 2, in this research I further 
explore individuals’ incentives in exchanging information with like-minded people that 
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are moderated by the nature of virtual investment communities and individual statuses.  
Recall the data used for the study in Chapter 2, in virtual investment communities, all 
postings are organized in threads and the threads are organized in the reverse chronicle 
order based on the most recent posting in each thread.  An investor who decides to 
interact with others in a virtual investment community needs to decide which discussion 
thread(s) to join.  This structure of virtual investment communities particularly provides 
an ideal environment to study individuals’ choice and motives of interaction.  First, all 
interactions among investors are observed by researchers.  Second, we can reconstruct 
the choices of discussion threads by each investor when he/she decides to participate in 
the community.  The observed choice of discussion threads allows us to identify the 
underlying drivers for individual interactions in virtual investment communities. 
With the 72,019 individual participants in 29 stock message boards, my results 
show that increase in the availability of thread choices, increase in stock volatility, and 
holding minority opinion are associated with homophily behavior.  Membership size, on 
the other hand, determines whether homophily or heterophily behavior occurs.  The first 
three results are shown to be consistent with psychological needs that drive homophily 
behavior, and the last result indicates interactions between economic rationales and 
psychological homophily.  This study investigates that the underlying interactive 
mechanisms of online investors is principally motivated by homophily behavior due to 
cognitive biases and psychological needs instead of economic concerns. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 3.2, in addition to the 
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recap of some relevant literature detailed in Chapter 2 including bounded rationality, 
homophily behavior, information economic rationale of information seeking, and 
psychological biases of online investors, I will particularly present literature review on 
individual participation in virtual communities.  Theories and hypotheses of individual 
interactions and choices of discussion threads are given in Section 3.3.  I discuss 
methodology and data in Section 3.4.  I present the same set of data from Yahoo! 
Finance for analysis as in Chapter 2, with some detailed description specifically for 
individual choice of discussion threads in this section.  Empirical analysis and results 
are given in Section 3.5.  Finally I present complete discussions and concluding remarks 
of the homophily and individual interaction studies in virtual investment communities in 
Section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
This study is related to two main streams of literature: studies on individual 
participation in virtual communities (Butler 2001; Wasko and Faraj 2005; Kuk 2006; Ma 
and Agarawal 2007) and studies on homophily in social interactions (e.g. Lazarsfeld and 
Merton 1954; McPherson et al. 2001). 
Individual incentives of participation in virtual communities play an antecedent 
role for this research.  Studies have shown that a variety of social and economic factors 
influence people participating in online networks.  Butler (2001) provides a 
resourced-based framework that suggests resource availability and benefit provision 
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jointly influence individual participation in virtual communities.  Specifically, while an 
increasing number of members can make available more resources, it could become more 
difficult for community members to obtain benefits from the virtual communities, leading 
to less participation (Asvanund et al. 2003; Butler 2001).  Wasko and Faraj (2005) 
identify that one of the key resources provided by virtual communities is social capital.  
Their analysis of professional virtual networks finds that professional reputation and 
network position drive individual participation in virtual communities.  Ma and Agarwal 
(2007) extend the theory further, finding that perceived identity verification promotes 
participations in virtual communities.  As a result, IT artifacts for identity 
communications offered by virtual communities have a significant influence on 
participation.  These studies provide an in-depth look at the relationship between 
individuals and virtual communities.  I complement these studies by taking a step 
further to consider how individuals interact within a virtual community.  Like physical 
societies, each virtual community consists of many small groups and each individual 
interact with only a limited number of groups.  How individuals choose to interact has 
profound influence on information generation and distribution in virtual communities. 
Understanding individuals’ choice to interact with others is particularly important 
in virtual investment communities.  These communities reach tens of thousands of 
active members and receive hundreds or even thousands of postings per day.  Studies on 
information overload and bounded rationality (Jones et al. 2004; Simon 1957) highlights 
the necessary in such cases for individuals to be selective in interacting, as presented in 
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Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 (e.g. Broadbent 1958; DeMarzo et al. 2003).  I extend these 
studies to provide a systematic analysis of the influence of information overload on 
choice of interaction in such an information-rich environment. 
My research on interactions in virtual communities is also closely related to social 
science and social psychology literature that examines human interactions in offline 
communities.  Prior homophily studies have largely focused on status homophily rooted 
in social psychological theories, as discussed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2.  A key 
difference between virtual communities and physical communities is the lack of 
commonly observed status artifacts in these communities.  Few studies exist to date to 
examine individual interactions in such communities and what motivate(s) the 
interactions.  My research, therefore, adds to homophily studies to virtual communities 
and shows that psychological biases of individuals particularly in the context of investors 
are major drivers of homophily behavior in such settings. 
 
3.3 Theories and Hypotheses 
Whether community fragmentation or information aggregation prevails in virtual 
investment communities is resulted from individual information seeking and interactions.  
Two competing theories, information economics and psychological perspective, explain 
how individuals seek information and interact with each other through opposite lenses, as 
detailed in Chapter 2.  Further, extant literature has argued that information overload 
(e.g. Jones et al. 2004), the existence of uncertainty (e.g. Zhang 2006), and membership 
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size (e.g. Butler 2001) will significantly moderate the information seeking behavior.  In 
the following I will discuss these three factors separately. 
 
3.3.1 Moderating Role of Information Overload 
There is unprecedented amount of information from heterogeneous sources in 
virtual investment communities.  The information may result in information overload, 
the condition in which the amount of information far exceeds an individual’s processing 
capacity such that he/she cannot process and utilize all input communications (Rogers 
and Agarwala-Rogers 1975).  Individuals demonstrate “bounded rationality” in such 
cases, as they experience psychological limits in processing information and solving 
problems at one point of time (Simon 1957). 
Information overload plays a significant role in individual interactions within 
virtual communities.  When the amount of information is within an individual’s 
processing ability, there is little need for selective and filtered processing.  Such need, 
however, increases sharply with the presence of information overload (Broadbent 1958; 
DeMarzo et al. 2003).  Jones et al. (2004) show that information overload forces 
community members to be selective of information—in particular to ignore information 
that requires significant processing effort and put more weights on information with less 
processing cost. 
In virtual communities, a discussion thread is centered on a particular discussion 
topic.  A large number of discussion thread choices present the possibility for 
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information overload problem as individuals may only have capability to process a 
limited number of topics.  This is especially a key issue for online investors in virtual 
investment communities.  These communities routinely receive hundreds of threads 
daily that can overwhelm the most dedicated online investors.  The excess number of 
discussion topics involved in member interactions then leads to information overload and 
the selective information seeking behavior results.  Prior homophily studies, in addition, 
consistently show that individuals become more selective in a large community (Mollica 
et al. 2003). 
Online investors, as discussed earlier, present various psychological biases that 
affect their information seeking and interaction behavior.  Specifically, anchoring and 
illusions of control and knowledge drive individuals to seek like-minded opinions to 
reinforce their original beliefs.  Searching for confirmatory information requires less 
cognitive effort and processing cost with reduced coordination needed and limited 
amount of disagreement (Rabin and Schrag 1999).  Therefore, when online investors 
become selective in processing information due to information overload, they are more 
likely to interact with like-minded others, i.e. choosing to post in discussion threads with 
smaller opinion distance.  (Recall that opinion distance is used to represent the similarity 
between the individual belief and the aggregated opinion from a discussion thread, as 
presented in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.)  In addition, the number of threads available in 
virtual investment communities also influences individual selection by providing more 
opportunities for the investor to identify threads with similar sentiments.  I thus propose 
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the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1.  An investor is more likely to post in a discussion thread with smaller 
opinion distance when there exist more concurrent discussion threads. 
 
3.3.2 Moderating Role of Uncertainty 
Investors are known to overweight their priors relative to new information due to 
anchoring bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and overconfidence (Barber and Odean 
2001a).  Recent studies further show that investors overweight prior beliefs even more 
when there is greater information uncertainty (e.g. Jiang et al. 2005; Zhang 2006).  For 
example, Zhang (2006) studies whether analysts and investors exhibit more behavioral 
biases when greater information uncertainty exists.  It is shown that if analysts 
under-react to new information when revising their forecasts due to behavioral biases, 
they under-react even more in the case of greater information uncertainty.  Information 
uncertainty refers to the ambiguity stemmed either from the firm’s stock volatility or poor 
information (Zhang 2006).  As more frequent and more speculative investment 
decisions take place, overconfidence in addition will operationally manifest itself 
(Konana and Balasubramanian 2005). 
Prior research suggests that when there is greater information uncertainty, 
behavioral biases on stock investment decisions will be further strengthened.  
Information uncertainty comes from two sources for virtual investment community users.  
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First, stocks differ in their inherent volatility.  Some stocks such as utility stocks present 
much lower uncertainty than others (e.g. Internet stocks).  Stock characteristics thus 
have a significant influence on performance uncertainty.  Second, uncertainty can be 
found from an individual opinion status as compared with community consensus.  
Specifically, investors that hold minority opinion compared with the mass perceive 
greater uncertainty and are more likely to form homophily (e.g. Doyle and Kao 2007).  
These behavioral biases of online investors result in the tendency to seek out supportive 
opinions and reinforce their own prior beliefs.  Thus I state that: 
 
Hypothesis 2A.  When faced with higher stock volatility, an investor is more likely to 
post in a discussion thread with smaller opinion distance. 
Hypothesis 2B.  When an investor holds minority opinion, he/she is more likely to post 
in a discussion thread with smaller opinion distance. 
 
3.3.3 Role of Membership Size 
The effects of membership size on individual information seeking and interactions 
are two-fold from both economic and psychological perspectives.  From economic 
resource-based viewpoint, members are an important source of “resources” (Butler 2001).  
These resources mainly include greater information sources available from diverse 
knowledge sharing among a large community of online members.  In addition, for those 
seeking to increase visibility and audience in virtual communities, a larger group of 
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community members is preferred over a smaller one with like-minded members (Butler 
2001), increasing the audience resources in virtual communities (e.g. Fulk et al. 1996).  
I thus propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3A.  An investor is more likely to post in a discussion thread with more 
participants for greater information sources. 
 
In the context of virtual investment communities, online investors seek 
information and audience resources by joining discussion threads.  In particular, a larger 
membership size provides greater possibility and access to economic resources 
(McPherson 1983).  Therefore, to increase the availability of economic resources, online 
investors are motivated by resource-based rationale to seek out interactions in discussion 
threads with a larger number of dissimilar participants.  Discussion threads with greater 
opinion distance are thus more likely to be chosen by community members for resources 
from a large membership size. 
On the other hand, a discussion thread with small membership size does not 
provide the economic resource accessibility as expected by community members.  
Community members joining smaller discussion threads are thus no longer driven by 
economic resource-based concerns.  Instead, community members may be more 
motivated by psychological biases in seeking social support such as self-identification, 
social enhancement, etc. from a smaller group in virtual communities (Dholakia et al. 
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2004).  Particularly, smaller groups of discussions may induce lower level of knowledge 
diversity, thereby decreasing information sources yet enhancing self-identification and 
confirmatory bias (Harrison et al. 2002; Mojzisch et al. 2008).  Therefore, online 
investors tend to participate in smaller thread discussions in which there are smaller 
opinion distances to seek out supportive sentiments based on psychological needs.  
Based on the above arguments, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3B.  For a discussion thread, if the membership size is small, an investor is 
more likely to post in this particular thread with the presence of small opinion distance. 
 
The considered factors and the proposed relationships constitute individual 
interactions and thread choices in virtual investment communities, as depicted in Figure 
3.1. 
 
3.4 Methodology and Data 
This study uses the same set of data from Yahoo! Finance as described in Chapter 
2.  The multinomial logit (MNL) framework is adopted to model the choice process.  
Recall that the probability that discussion thread k is chosen by investor i, given choice 
set C of 10 most recent unique discussion threads is 
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if thread k is in choice set C and zero otherwise. ikX indicate the discussion 
thread-related mix variables.  I explain the choice modeling and the variables in the 
following and summarize them in Table 3.1. 
 
Independent Variable: Individual Choice of Discussion Threads 
As discussed earlier, for each individual arriving at a stock message board and 
observing a list of discussion threads, I define the choice set as the 10 most recent unique 
discussion threads for each investor at each choice phase.  Thus, 1 indicates that the 
individual chooses to post in a certain thread, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Dependent Variables (Main Effects) 
Three variables constitute the main effects of psychological needs and economic 
rationales on individual choice of discussion threads. 
 
Opinion distance.  The opinion distance between investor i and each choice of 
discussion thread k is computed as the absolute difference of investor i’s sentiment value 
and the average sentiment value of all messages in thread k.  Notice here I use the 
average sentiment value of all messages in thread k due to the assumption that an investor 
will not post in a thread until he/she reads through all messages posted in this certain 
discussion thread. 
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Number of concurrent threads.  The number of concurrent threads is calculated as that 
for a discussion thread, the total number of unique threads in a certain stock message 
board that have occurred within one-hour frame prior to the first message time of this 
particular thread.  This is to capture the effect of information overload on individual 
choice of threads resulted from the increasing number of available thread choices. 
 
Number of participants.  The number of participants is calculated as that for a discussion 
thread, the number of unique participants within this particular thread.  This accounts 
for the effect of membership size on individual choice of threads based on economic 
resource-based viewpoint. 
 
Dependent Variables (Moderating Effects) 
To understand the underlying driving forces that affect homophily and community 
fragmentation of opinions, the interaction terms accounting for the moderating effects on 
opinion distance according to the hypotheses are considered.  In addition to the 
moderating effects of the numbers of concurrent threads and participants, as detailed 
above, two more variables for the effects of uncertainty are also included. 
 
Stock volatility.  Stock volatility is calculated based on monthly historical stock 
volatility data downloaded from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).  Each 
thread choice will then be associated with a stock volatility value at the time period it 
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occurred. 
 
Opinion status.  An individual’s opinion status is represented by a dummy variable with 
1 indicating that the investor holds a minority opinion and 0 for holding a majority 
opinion on a stock.  Minority opinion is defined as if the sentiment of an investor differs 
from 90% of his/her peers. 
 
Controls 
Our MNL model includes the following control variables.  First, at the individual 
level, information overload can exert multiple influences on investor’s selection of 
discussion threads.  In particular, as the posted messages in virtual investment 
communities refresh frequently, information overload will limit online investors to focus 
on more recent discussions.  The term “recent” here can be explained by the following 
two concepts. 
 
Thread position.  It refers to the position of each discussion thread, explained by 
cognitive processing costs—the cost of browsing and the cost of clicking to the next page 
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2006a).  For a discussion thread in the choice set, the thread position 
is relative to other threads in reverse chronicle order when an investor arrives at the 
message board, that is, 0 means the most recent and 9 means the furthest thread.  For an 
investor, the recent discussion threads are often more visible and accessible to the 
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investors and thus are more likely to be selected.  However, the probability that the 
earlier discussion threads are viewed and selected drops dramatically, given the nature of 
virtual investment communities that those earlier discussion threads can be already 
pushed several web pages away.  This “diminishing” probability that a discussion thread 
is selected can be captured by including a quadratic form of discussion thread position. 
 
Thread life span.  The second concept of being “recent” refers to the age of a discussion 
thread.  It is differentiated from the concept of thread position: a discussion thread that 
is most easily viewed by online investors but with longer life span is considered less 
interesting to the investors.  In contrast to cognitive processing costs incurred by 
viewing threads from further positions, the concept of life span follows economic 
rationales that a thread occurred a longer time ago has less informational value.  Life 
span is calculated as the time (in minute) passed since the first message posting time in 
the discussion thread until the time an investor makes the choice decision. 
 
Stock volatility and opinion status.  Finally, the direct effects of stock volatility and 
opinion status on individual choice of discussions are also controlled for the modeling. 
 
Based on the above variable definitions, to facilitate the MNL modeling, I 
reorganize the posting data from the 29 stock message boards to the form in which for 
each of the 72,019 participants, 10 choices of most recent discussion threads are being 
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considered.  For each thread choice, the following information is then acquired or 
computed: stock ticker, whether or not the investor posted in this thread (1 for yes and 0 
for no), opinion distance, the number of concurrent threads, the number of participants, 
stock volatility, opinions status, thread position, and life span.  The descriptive statistics 
and correlations among the key variables are given in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, 
respectively. 
 
3.5 Empirical Analysis and Results 
Given the above model and variable description, I present the full MNL modeling 
results in Table 3.4.  The estimates account for the moderating effects of the number of 
concurrent threads, the number of participants, stock volatility, and minority opinion 
status on the influence of opinion distance for investors’ thread selection.  The result 
shows that Hypothesis 1 is supported (β=-0.1635).  It suggests that, for a discussion 
thread, each unit increase in the number of concurrent threads, on average, partially 
reduces the probability that this particular thread being chosen by 1.37% with maximum 
possible opinion distance, yet by 0.92% with minimum possible opinion distance.  That 
is, as the availability of thread choices increases, individuals are more motivated to 
choose the thread with smaller opinion distance.  The result demonstrates that the 
homophily exacerbates when individuals have more choices and when information 
overload limits individual capacity to process all available information.  Thus, investors 
are more likely to seek out information from like-minded opinions (smaller opinion 
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distance). 
The results show that Hypotheses 2A and 2B are supported.  The estimate 
β=-0.0622 indicates that, for a discussion thread, each unit increase in stock volatility, on 
average, partially reduces the probability that this particular thread being chosen by 
0.67% with maximum possible opinion distance, yet by 0.06% with minimum possible 
opinion distance.  This finding shows that when the stock volatility is higher, individuals 
are more motivated to choose the thread with smaller opinion distance.  The result also 
reveals that individuals who hold minority opinions are more likely to interact with 
like-minded people.  By having dummy 1 for minority opinion and 0 for majority 
opinion, β=-0.0834 indicates that the effect of individuals holding minority opinions to 
form homophily (by choosing threads with smaller opinion distance) is significantly 
stronger than that of individuals holding majority opinions by 0.0834 unit.  These results 
present supportive findings for finance literature that when the market is more unstable or 
when investors hold less popular sentiments, in contrast to being economically rational, 
they will rely more on cognitive biases and psychological needs when participating in 
discussions and exchanging information. 
The results also support Hypotheses 3A and 3B.  With β=1.5206, the main effect 
of the number of participants on individual choice is shown.  For a discussion thread, 
each unit increase in the number of participants, on average, partially increases the 
probability that this particular thread being chosen by 3.54%.  That is, the higher the 
number of participants in a discussion thread, the greater the possible information sources, 
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and the more likely an investor to select this thread, supporting Hypothesis 3A.  
Estimate β=0.3055 supports Hypothesis 3B for the moderating effect of the number of 
participants on opinion distance for individual choice.  For a discussion thread, each unit 
decrease in the number of participants, on average, partially reduces the probability that 
this particular thread being chosen by 1.32% with maximum possible opinion distance, 
yet increases the probability that this particular thread being chosen by 7.87% with 
minimum possible opinion distance.  That is, individuals who post in smaller discussion 
threads are more likely to be motivated by psychological biases, while those posting in 
larger discussion threads are driven more by economic needs.  This finding aligns with 
the fact that, both information economics and psychological factors influence individual 
interactions in virtual investment communities.  Smaller discussion threads have less 
informational value and therefore people who interact within them are more likely to be 
driven to seek confirmatory opinions.  Larger threads, on the contrary, are considered to 
have greater informational value.  Investors who choose larger threads are more likely to 
be driven by information economic concerns to seek economic resources. 
 
3.6 Discussions and Concluding Remarks 
In the studies of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I empirically examine interaction 
behavior of online investors based on both information economics and psychological 
theories.  I show that investors’ behaviors are influenced mainly by psychological 
considerations.  From psychological perspective, investors demonstrate clear biases 
 48
towards associating with like-minded people in virtual investment communities and their 
biases are strengthened when more thread choices are concurrent, when fewer members 
are participating, when the market is more volatile and when individuals hold minority 
sentiments.  The behavior is consistent with the hypotheses derived from cognitive and 
psychological theories.  However, life span and membership size of discussion threads 
reduce the influence of cognitive and psychological drivers and show that threads with 
greater informational sources and value are more likely to be chosen.  The results 
indicate that individual choices are influenced by both economic and psychological 
considerations, yet psychological needs constitute most drivers of individual choice of 
discussions. 
This study provides empirical validation to previous literature on homophily and 
on community fragmentation (McPherson et al. 2001; Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 
2005).  In addition, by investigating the underlying individual selection of discussion 
groups, my research represents one of the first attempts to study individual interaction 
behavior in virtual communities and identify the informational value of virtual 
investment communities. 
This study has several limitations.  First, current analysis does not account for 
the impact of the interaction activity on individual opinion.  Individual opinions can be 
mediated during the repeated interactions with other investors.  A typical example is 
polarization, the phenomenon that individuals tend to take more extreme opinions after 
group interactions (Isenberg 1986).  It renders us a more complete understanding of the 
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driving forces of individual selection of discussion threads and community fragmentation 
if how individual opinions alter during group interactions is unraveled.  Second, in 
addition to the posted discussion threads considered in virtual investment communities 
and the stock volatility, there are external factors such as financial news that can also 
impact individual opinions pertaining to certain stocks (Tetlock 2007).  Third, the 
underlying mechanisms of user interactions in stock message boards can be further 
explored.  From the data used in my study, different stock message boards pertain to 
different levels of online investor participation and interactions.  The relationship among 
the stock characteristics, forum participation activity, and the extent that investor 
opinions are influenced is not yet explored in this study.  Finally, the impact of online 
investors’ interaction behavior on community structure and virtual group formation could 
be of great interest. 
An understanding of these research issues is important for both theory and 
practice.  This research suggests evidence explaining the community fragmentation and 
individual interaction in virtual investment communities.  In addition, realizing 
community fragmentation serves as the first avenue towards understanding how online 
users obtain information from virtual communities and how the interactions in virtual 
investment communities impact user opinions and alter their economic decisions.  The 
business value and market performance resulted from the fragmentation within virtual 
investment communities are of particular importance.  My exploration shows online 
investors look for like-minded interactions, contrary to the prediction of economic 
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rationales.  Such behavior could have significant implications for market efficiency and 
raises important public policy questions. 
From a practical perspective, the result of the study can be applicable to a broad 
category of virtual communities, and provide guidelines to practitioners such as virtual 
community moderators and businesses who are interested in understanding the 
distribution of information and advertising to virtual community members.  For instance, 
knowing whether and how online individual opinions fragment helps segment virtual 
community members, enabling businesses to design customized marketing campaign and 
pricing scheme for different types of individuals.  This extra piece of profile information 
can also be incorporated into virtual community platform designs, serving as an index for 
virtual community members to judge and value others’ opinions. 
These studies show how virtual community members interact with each other and 
how they value opinions in virtual communities, suggesting community fragmentation 
resulted from private individual choices.  The level of community fragmentation can be 
influenced by virtual community operators when the factors of virtual community 
member interactions influencing this fragmentation are known.  Exploring the issues 
detailed above will advance the understanding of the value of virtual communities as 
informational media and how they shape user opinions and preferences in today’s 
networked economy. 
In the next chapter, I present a specific study to demonstrate the informational 
value of virtual communities for businesses in the context of online retailing.  In 
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particular, the research studies how consumer consideration and choice of products are 
impacted by online recommendations, and thus imply a significant change in the 
landscape of product competition in online retailers. 
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Chapter 4: Implications of Consumer Consideration and Choice with 
Online Recommendations: Product Competition in Online Retailers 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Digital commerce has significantly altered the landscape of retailing.  One of the 
most well-known phenomena is the Long Tail.  The Long Tail of electronic commerce 
indicates the longer-lasting availability of slow-moving and rare products (Anderson 
2006).  Without physical constraints faced by traditional stores, online retailers provide 
unprecedented product varieties to their customers (Brynjolfsson et al. 2006b; Clemons et 
al. 2006).  This is particularly facilitated by the ability of online retailers to catalog, 
recommend, and sell a large number of products (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003).  As a result, 
with the help of online retailers, consumers are able to discover, evaluate and shop a 
greater variety of products than they previously could at brick-and-mortar stores 
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2003 & 2006b; Ghose et al. 2006).  This opportunity to access a 
wider selection of products may lead to a transformation of the way in which online 
consumers consider product alternatives to identify the most promising purchases.  
Specifically, when the number of products vying for a consumer’s attention increases, it 
is likely that more alternatives are considered by the consumer before making purchase 
decisions (Anderson 2006).  Thus, greater product variety will expand a consumer 
consideration set of product alternatives. 
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The explosive application of online product recommendations, however, has made 
the expansion of the consumer consideration set in digital commerce debatable.  In fact, 
prior research has shown with experimentation that the size of consumer consideration set 
could become smaller due to product recommendations in online retailers (Häubl and 
Trifts 2000).  This consideration set shrinkage could be explained by two main factors.  
First, whether or not a consumer considers an additional product depends on the trade-off 
between the marginal benefits and costs of considering it (e.g. Hauser and Wernerfelt 
1990; Robert and Lattin 1991).  However, the marginal benefit of considering an 
additional product rapidly decreases with online recommendations because the relative 
product utilities are now accessible from screened and ranked product alternatives based 
on prior consumer transactions.  As a result, online recommendations lead to a reduction 
in the number of products needed to be considered (Häubl and Trifts 2000).  Second, 
product recommendations might “reinforce” the position of products on online consumers 
such that “a rich-get-richer effect for popular products is created, and vice-versa for 
unpopular products” (e.g. Fleder and Hosanagar 2008; Mooney and Roy 2000).  This 
will result in a reduction in product variety, contradicting to what the Long Tail 
phenomenon indicates. 
The possible shrinkage of consumer consideration of products in online retailers 
has significant implications for product competition.  Product competition arises when 
consumers make purchase decisions among multiple products that are imperfect 
substitutes to each other.  For example, a consumer in the market for a Digital SLR 
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camera often considers products offered by multiple manufacturers ranging from Canon 
to Sony.  Each of the manufacturers can also offer more than one product model to 
target different market segments.  However, as the number of products possibly 
considered by consumes decreases, it suggests that manufacturers now need to face two 
levels of competition.  Products need to compete for not only being ultimately 
purchased but also being at least first taken into consideration by consumers.  This 
highlights the importance of investigating product competition for both consideration and 
choice to understand the impact of consideration set shrinkage on product competition in 
online commerce.  Therefore, I address two research questions in this study: a) To what 
degree do online consumers consider product alternatives in making purchase decisions? 
and b) How do products compete for consideration and for choice, given the reduced size 
of consideration set in online retailers? 
Marketing literature has developed a number of models that account for the 
two-level decision making process of consumers, consideration and choice (e.g. Andrews 
and Srinivasan 1995; Nedungadi 1990; Roberts and Lattin 1991).  However, these 
models require micro level data about individual choice among multiple 
products—information that is difficult to obtain by manufacturers.  In this study, I 
develop a new model that requires only aggregate demand data to identify the size of 
consideration set and the resulting product competition in both consideration and choice 
stages.  The model leverages a new form of aggregate data provided by online retailers 
that identify conditional product demand given consumers considering an alternative 
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product.  A well-known example of such aggregate data is provided by Amazon in the 
form of “What Do Customers Ultimately Buy After Viewing This Item?”.  The data 
provide percentage of customers purchasing an alternative product given they have 
considered a certain product.  The percentage represents statistics on the conditional 
probability of consumer purchase propensity given their consideration of a particular 
product.  The model shows that we can recover from the statistics of both the probability 
of each product being considered and the probability that a product being chosen given it 
is considered by a consumer. 
I apply the model to 38,400 unique products collected from Amazon’s Electronics 
category at two different time periods.  Besides the conditional purchase data, the data 
also include sales rank, sale price, and online customer review rating for each product.  
The results show that the consideration set size of online consumers is fairly small in 
real-world digital commerce.  Specifically, more than half (53.294%) of the purchase 
decisions are made by consumers considering two or fewer alternative products.  This 
finding leads to the differentiated product competition for consideration and for choice.  
That is, a product does well for consideration may not do so well for purchase choice, and 
vice versa.  In particular, I show that because of the shrinkage of consideration sets, 
being considered by consumers plays a dominant role for product competition in online 
retailers.  The findings further indicate that pricing strategies only influence the product 
competition in choice stage.  It suggests that despite overwhelming focus on pricing 
competition in earlier studies (e.g. Brown and Goolsbee 2002), with the presence of 
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product recommendations in online retailers, pricing plays a rather limited role in product 
competition for consideration. 
This study sheds lights on the distinctive nature of product competition resulted 
from the small-sized consideration sets in online retailers.  The results provide 
significant implications for manufacturers.  Getting into a consumer’s consideration 
requires establishing product awareness, while ensuring the product being chosen by a 
consumer requires convincing consumers of the product value (e.g. Lilien et al. 1995).  
Therefore, different marketing and advertising strategies (e.g. awareness advertising and 
persuasive advertising) need to be developed to address these challenges in online 
consideration and choice of products. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows.  In Section 4.2, I review the 
prior literature as it relates to the research topic.  In Section 4.3, I present the theories 
and methodologies to measure consumer consideration and choice and the resulting 
product competition in both stages.  I present the data and modeling results along with 
discussions in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, respectively.  I conclude this chapter in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
The prevalence of digital commerce in recent years has inspired growing interests 
in product variety and consumer purchase decisions in online retailers.  The first stream 
of related literature is concerned about the increased product variety provided by online 
retailers (e.g. Anderson 2006; Brynjolfsson et al. 2003 & 2006b; Oestreicher-Singer and 
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Sundararajan 2006).  In particular, the long tails of electronic commerce introduce the 
longer-lasting availability of slow-moving and rare products compared with traditional 
brick-and-mortar stores, which creates a greater variety of products (Brynjolfsson et al. 
2003 & 2006b).  The authors suggest that the higher level of product variety in online 
retailers may change the sets of products that are considered profitable and expand the 
number of products considered by a consumer.  Wider selection and lower search costs 
facilitated by recommendations in digital commerce help consumers discover niche 
products and thus increase product variety (Anderson 2006). 
The wider selection of products and lower search costs offered in digital markets 
leads to the relevant literature relates to the retailer-level competition on the Internet (e.g. 
Baye et al. 2004; Clay et al. 2001; Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001).  Specifically, price 
competition in online retailers has been extensively studied.  Brown and Goolsbee 
(2002), for instance, find that online markets reduce search costs of consumers by 
enabling online price comparisons.  As a result, product prices are reduced significantly.  
Recent studies further show that price competition in online retailers can be mitigated by 
other factors.  Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) study price sensitivity of online 
consumers in online retailers, BarnesandNoble.com and Amazon.com.  Their research 
indicates that Barnes & Noble faces much stronger online price competition from 
Amazon than Amazon does from Barnes & Noble.  There is also significant switching 
cost in online retailers (Chen and Hitt 2002).  Shopbots on electronic markets, in 
addition, provide opportunities for online retailers to leverage brand names and pricing 
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strategies to differentiate their products (Smith 2002). 
The idea that the Long Tail allows for a wider selection of product variety, 
however, shows mixed results in previous literature.  Specifically, collaborative filters 
might reinforce the recommended products on consumers such that the already popular 
products become more popular, and vice versa for unpopular products (Mooney and Roy 
2000; Fleder and Hosanagar 2008).  As a result, a smaller set of products is constantly 
reinforced and the number of product alternatives consumers may consider will drop 
accordingly.  In addition, relative product utilities can be accessible from online 
recommendations based on prior consumer preferences and purchases (Häubl and Trifts 
2000).  Therefore, the presence of online recommendations decreases the marginal 
benefits of considering more product alternatives.  This leads to a reduced consideration 
set, the set of products consumers may consider before making purchase decisions. 
The possible shrinkage of consideration sets before purchases highlights the 
importance of a different level of competition in addition to price competition—the 
product competition in online retailers.  This draws upon the literature that consumers 
may not consider all available products when making purchase decisions in a variety of 
marketing studies (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990; Nedungadi 1990; Roberts and Lattin 
1991).  These studies have shown that, from the angles of ad hoc, deterministic, or 
probabilistic models, consumers’ consideration of products will significantly impact their 
ultimate choices of products.  In particular, faced with cognitive limitations, complex 
choice tasks, and evaluation costs, consumers will resort to phased decision strategies 
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(Gensch 1987).  The phased consumer decision making process mainly involves two 
stages.  In the consideration stage, consumers consider a smaller set of products and 
form the choice set.  In the choice stage, consumers evaluate every product in the choice 
set and purchase the one with the highest evaluation. 
Different effective marketing strategies for products to be “aware of” and to be 
“thought of high value” to consumers have also been explored.  Product awareness has 
significant effects on consumer choice, requiring different marketing strategies to address 
the issues (McMahon 1980).  In particular, products with higher quality may not be 
preferable by consumers given poorer product awareness (Hoyer and Brown 1990).  
Products also compete to remain in consumers’ implicit memory rather than for a 
short-term stimulus to be purchased more likely (Lee 2002).  This research vein is 
relevant to my study because it accounts for the possible impacts on strategies due to 
product competition resulted from the drastic change in consideration and choice in 
online retailers.  Further, product competition for different purposes—for being 
considered versus being chosen—may result in different strategic concerns in pricing, 
advertising, and manufacturing for the manufacturers. 
 
4.3 Theories and Methodologies 
4.3.1 Revealed Preferences in Online Retailers 
Online retailers provide a variety of product sales statistics that reveal consumer 
preferences.  In this study, I investigate a particular type of such statistics provided by 
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Amazon.com—“What Do Customers Ultimately Buy After Viewing This Item?,” as 
shown in Figure 4.1.  The figure indicates that Amazon not only provides the products 
ultimately bought by consumers after viewing the item, but also provides percentages of 
consumers who do so for each alternative product.  These percentages are essentially 
conditional probabilities of consumers purchasing product Y after they have considered 
product X3.  As shown in Figure 4.1, Amazon provides such statistics for the top four 
alternative products that often cover a large amount of purchases.  This allows us to 
construct a conditional probability matrix for a given set of product alternatives.  For 
example, Table 4.1 shows four digital camera alternatives from Amazon.com.  In each 
cell, Amazon presents the percentages of consumers who purchased the column product 
after having considered the row product. 
Two observations could be drawn from Table 4.1.  First, a significant percentage 
of consumers purchase the product they just viewed.  The percentage is 66%, 78%, 81%, 
and 66% for the four products in Table 4.1.  The surprisingly high percentage indicates 
that there is limited product competition among four products mainly being considered in 
online commerce.  If each consumer considered two products before they make a 
purchase decision, then the average probability of purchasing product X after viewing 
product X should be 50%.  The results from Table 4.1 indicate that on average each 
consumer considers less than two products in making purchase decisions despite the 
unprecedented level of product variety indicated by the Long Tail.  Second, consumers 
                                                 
3 X and Y could be the same product.  
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demonstrate clear brand preference.  Consumers who viewed product X but ultimately 
purchased an alternative product is more likely to purchase a product from the same 
brand than from a rival brand.  For example, consumers who viewed Sony S700 but did 
not purchase Sony S700 are more likely to buy another Sony camera (i.e. Sony DSCW) 
than buying either of the Canon cameras.  I observe the same phenomenon for Canon.  
Consumers who viewed Canon A570 but did not purchase Canon A570 are more likely to 
buy Canon A560 than either of the Sony Cameras. 
The objective of the study is to first show the number of product alternatives 
generally being considered by consumers and second, the resulting product competition 
from the conditional probabilities provided by Amazon.  I start with showing a simple 
illustration on how to identify consideration stage and choice stage from the conditional 
probability using a case of two products.  I then present the formal model in the next 
subsection. 
Consider only two differentiated products are competing in a market.  
Consumers make purchase decisions in two stages.  In the consideration stage, they 
form a consideration set which can include either one of two products or both.  In the 
choice stage, they make purchase decisions.  Each consumer purchases one and only 
one product.4  If his/her consideration set consists of one product, the consumer just 
purchases the product in the consideration set.  If his/her consideration set consists of 
                                                 
4 This assumption is necessarily because Amazon’s statistics are reported on all consumers who made a 
purchase.  Consumers who viewed a product but did not make any purchase are excluded from the 
statistics.   
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both products, the consumer chooses the one that yields the higher utility.  The purchase 
decision in this case is modeled with a logit model.  The challenge we face is that we do 
not have data on individual consumer consideration sets or purchase decisions.  Instead, 
we only observe the aggregate conditional probability of purchase propensity given a 
product is considered.  That is, we observe four statistics for a market of two products X 
and Y, namely P(X|Y∈C), P(X|X∈C), P(Y|X∈C), and P(Y|Y∈C), where P(i|j∈C) in this 
case refers to the probability of consumers purchasing product i given that they have 
considered product j.  The ultimate goal is to identify the two stages of product 
competition using the conditional probabilities P(i|j∈C). 
We note that product competition is determined by four variables related to 
consideration and choice.  Let D(X) be the probability that a consumer will consider 
product X and D(Y) be the probability that a consumer will consider product Y.  Let B(X) 
be the utility provided by product X and B(Y) be the utility provided by product Y.  D(X) 
and D(Y) determine the probability that a certain size of consideration set occurs, and 
describes product competition for consumers’ consideration.  B(X) and B(Y), on the 
other hand, describe product competition for consumer purchases given both are 
considered.  I show below the four variables can be identified from the four conditional 
probabilities of purchase propensity.  I first note that the conditional probability of 
purchase propensity P(i|j∈C) equals the joint probability that a consumer considers j but 
ultimately purchases i divided by his/her marginal probability of considering j, that is, 
P(i|j∈C) = Prob[(purchase i)∩(consider j)] | Prob[consider j].  Note that an individual’s 
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probability of considering j is simply D(j).  In addition, an individual’s probability of 
purchasing i and considering j equals the probability that the individual considers both 
products i and j and that he/she chooses product i.  Based on the above notations, we 
can now identify for the two products X and Y, the probability that a certain size of 
consideration set occurs and the competition for consideration (D(X) and D(Y)) and in 
choice (B(X) and B(Y)), using the conditional probabilities of purchase propensity, 
P(i|j∈C). 
First, in the two-product example, the consideration set C can be represented as 
set {X}, {Y}, or {X,Y}.  In the consideration stage, the probability that product X only is 
included in consideration set C can then be represented 
as )),(1)(()( YDXDCXP −=∈ and the probability that product Y only is included in 
consideration set C can be represented as )())(1()( YDXDCYP −=∈ .  Similarly, the 
probability that both products X and Y are considered is represented 
as )()())()(( YDXDCYCXP =∈∩∈ .  The probability that a certain size of 
consideration set occurs can then be computed as 
).())(1())(1)(()( YDXDYDXD1 Size SetionConsideratP −+−==  (4.1) 
).()()( YDXD2 Size SetionConsideratP ==  (4.2) 
In the choice stage, the probability that X is purchased given a certain 
consideration set depends not only on its purchase propensity but also on what is included 
in the consideration set, that is, for product X, 
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))(exp())(exp(
))(exp(}),{|(
YBXB
XBYXXP += , using logit model. 
Similarly, for product Y, we have 0}){|( =XYP , 1}){|( =YYP , and 
))(exp())(exp(
))(exp(}),{|(
YBXB
YBYXYP += , using logit model. 
Using the above calculations, the D(X), D(Y), B(X), and B(Y) can be identified 
implicitly with the conditional probabilities of purchase propensity, P(i|j∈C) based on the 
following equations: 
.
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)()())(1)((
))))(exp()(exp())(exp()(()())(1)(()|(
YDXDXDYD
YBBXYBYDXDXDYDYYP +−
++−=  (4.6) 
In the following subsection, I present full extension of the two-product example to 
a formal model. 
 
4.3.2 Aggregate Two-Stage Consideration Choice Model 
It is straight forward to extend the two product analysis to multiple products.  
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The approach has been used in prior marketing literature that focuses on individual level 
analysis (e.g. Andrews and Srinivasan 1995).  I show this approach can be extended to 
aggregate level data.  First, in the consideration stage, assume Di to denote the 
probability that any given product i is considered.  Di is crucial in this study: the 
presence of Di implies the way in which consumers consider a limited set of products 
facilitated by online recommendations.  This further implies the competition of a certain 
product being able to be brought into a consumer’s considerations.  Product competition 
reaches its highest intensity when Di reaches 100% for all products.  This would indicate 
that consumers consider all products in making purchase decisions. 
In the consideration stage, if the consideration probability Di of one product is 
significantly higher among other products in a given set of product alternatives, the 
probability of this particular product being the only product in a consumer’s 
consideration set becomes much higher.  Similarly, if the D values of two products are 
both significantly higher than others, then the consumer is more likely to consider two 
products in his/her consideration set before making purchases.  Formally, given the 
product groups of four product alternatives provided by Amazon.com, I calculate the 
probability of that a certain size of product consideration set occurs for each group as 
follows. 
( ) .1)( ∑ ∏ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −==
≠i ij
ji DD1 Size SetionConsideratP  (4.7) 
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The consideration probability Di, therefore, implies the product competition for 
being considered by consumers.  Specifically, the probability that a certain consideration 
set Ck of product alternatives will occur is calculated in terms of Di: 
( )∏∏
∉∈
−=
kk Ci
i
Ci
ik DDCP 1)( , }12,...,2,1{ −∈ nk for n products. (4.11) 
In the choice stage, the products contained in the choice set are being considered 
and evaluated by consumers.  I thus consider Bi to denote the utility of product i from 
inherent product-specific features such as price, quality, functionality, etc, which 
differentiate one product from another for consumer choice.  With Bi, I use the 
multinomial logit model (MNL) to assess the probability that product i is chosen given 
choice set Ck, that is, 
( ) ( )( ) ,expexp| ∑
∈
=
kCj
j
i
k B
B
CiP  (4.12) 
if product i is in Ck and zero otherwise (Roberts and Lattin 1991). 
Given Equations (4.11) and (4.12), we are able to derive the probability that a 
consumer chooses product i given that he/she has considered product j.  I denote this 
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conditional probability as )|(| CjiPP ji ∈= .  The conditional probability is determined 
by two factors, as mentioned in the two-product example: the probability that a 
consumer’s consideration set contains j and that he/she purchases product i.  Formally, 
we have 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ,
|
)|(| ∑
∑
∈
∈
=∈=
k
kk
k
kkk
ji CjICP
CjICiPCP
CjiPP  (4.13) 
where ( )kCjI ∈ =1 if true or 0 otherwise. 
The above formulation identifies the conditional purchase probability for a 
randomly selected consumer.  That is, jiP|  is the probability of choosing product i after 
considering product j for a given consumer.  Amazon.com aggregates the observed 
choices and presents the average preference of a large number (N) of previous consumers.  
We note that the individual event of a given consumer choosing product i after 
considering product follows a Bernoulli distribution with p= jiP| .  Based on the central 
limit theorem, the distribution of the Amazon’s aggregate measure follows a normal 
distribution ( )σμ,N , where 
jiP |=μ  and =2σ ( ) NPP jiji || 1− , (4.14) 
where N is the total number of previous consumers who purchased product i after having 
considered product j. 
To calibrate the proposed model, maximum likelihood estimation is adopted.  
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According to Equations (4.13) and (4.14), let *,tijP denote the observed probability that 
product i is purchased after considering product j at period t across n products, 
},...,2,1{, nji ∈ .  The log likelihood function for the model is then written as 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )( ) .121log2log, ||1 1 1
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i jitij
jijiii −
−−−−= ∑ ∑ ∑= = =  (4.15) 
Equation (4.15) provides the approach with which the consideration probabilities 
(Di) and the product utilities (Bi) can be identified from revealed preferences in 
conditional probabilities of purchase propensity.  Recall that Di denotes the probability 
that product i will be considered by a consumer, and Bi denotes the utility for product i, 
which reflects inherent brand-specific features.  Thus, the estimation would illustrate the 
product competition in consideration stage and in choice stage, depending on the values 
of Di’s and Bi’s, respectively. 
 
4.3.3 Demand Estimation 
The derivation of the probability that a certain choice set Ck occurs, )( kCP  in 
Equation (4.11), and the probability that a certain product is purchased given it is 
considered in the choice set, ( )kCiP |  in Equation (4.12), facilitate the estimation of 
product demands.  Specifically, given choice set Ck, the demand of product i can be 
estimated from the probability that it will be considered and the probability that it will be 
chosen among each type of consideration set.  That is, 
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k
kk CPCiPiP | . (4.16) 
 Equation (4.16) reveals that product demands on Amazon.com can be estimated 
from the readily available statistics of conditional purchase propensity.  In particular, 
demand for a product pertains to its capability to compete for consideration and its 
product utility evaluated by consumers. 
 
4.3.4 Price and Quality Effects in Product Competition 
In the above section I show that both stages of product competition can be 
identified from a one-period observation of conditional purchase propensity.  In this 
section, I further extend the methodology to separate price effect from quality effect in 
the setting of a panel data.  The extended approach is based on the notion that price 
changes influence the value of a product thus may affect product competition within 
consideration set for choice.  On the other hand, price changes have little influence on 
product competition for being considered. 
Let pit denote the price of product i at time t.  The utility of a given product at 
time t can then be represented as 
itiit bpaB −= . (4.17) 
Note that we could estimate product utility Bi from Equation (4.15), but the 
availability of panel data allows us to further identify ai and b.  Substitute Bit in 
Equation (4.17) for (4.12), the probability that product i is purchased given it is 
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considered at time t can be rewritten as a function of ai, b, and pit: 
( ) ( )( ) ,expexp| ∑
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and thus the conditional probability of purchase propensity in Equation (4.13) can be 
rewritten as, at time t, 
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The demand for product i at time t, denoted as Qit, can therefore be derived from 
the estimation in Equation (4.16) and from Equation (4.18): 
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4.4 Data 
The data I collect are from publicly available statistics of purchase propensity at 
Amazon’s “What Do Customers Ultimately Buy After Viewing This Item?” as shown in 
Figure 4.1.  The data are extracted using automated scripts to access and parse HTML 
pages from the retailer.  I start with the collection of 38,400 unique products under 
Electronics category in 9,600 product competition groups, as illustrated earlier in Table 
4.1.  Each product is accompanied with the conditional percentages of consumers 
buying one product after viewing another for the top three alternative products plus the 
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product itself.  The data collection results in a total number of 153,600 (= 38,400×4) 
data points per collect.  For every electronic product, the following information is 
included: conditional purchase propensity, sales rank and sale price. 
The data were collected in two separate time periods.  The first set was collected 
as one-time data points on May 15th, 2008 (Period 1), and the second set was collected 
one week later on May 22nd, 2008 (Period 2).  The data collection results in a short 
panel data with significant changes in price and sales rank for the products.  Table 4.2 
lists summary statistics for the data.  Note that in Table 4.2, C1 refers to the conditional 
purchase percentage for the most purchased product after viewing the product page, e.g. 
in Figure 4.1 it refers to 53%.  In most cases, the most purchased product is the product 
being viewed.  Similarly, C2 refers to the conditional purchase percentage of the second 
most purchased product after viewing the product page, i.e. in Figure 4.1 it refers to 18%.  
C3 and C4 follow the same rationales for the third and the fourth most purchased product, 
respectively. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results and Discussions 
The estimation is conducted for each group of substitute product alternatives.  
Figure 4.2 shows the average distribution of consideration set sizes across all product 
groups, according to Equations (4.7) to (4.10).  The y-axis represents the percentage of 
consumers that have the consideration set size corresponding to the x-axis value.  It 
shows that almost all consumers have a consideration set of two or fewer product 
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alternatives.  More than 40% of consumers consider only one product when making 
purchase decisions.  The results indicate that, although facing unprecedented product 
varieties provided by online retailers, in reality online consumers consider only a fairly 
small set of products when making purchase decisions due to the presence and 
reinforcement of online recommendations. 
As discussed above, this drastic shrinkage of consideration set has important 
impacts on product competition in online retailers.  For illustration, I first discuss 
product competition among the four camera alternatives listed in Table 4.1.  Table 4.3 
shows the estimation results of the consideration probability (D’s) and product utility (B’s) 
for Sony S700, Sony DSCW, Canon A570, and Canon A560.  Sony DSCW has the 
highest probability (D = 58%) of being considered by consumers.  Sony S700 is second 
most likely to be considered with D = 12.6%.  Canon A570 and A560, on the other hand, 
have relatively low consideration probabilities (D=6% and 2%, respectively).  However, 
the estimation shows that the most considered product, Sony DSCW, does not provide the 
best value to consumers.  The relative utility of the camera is 0.055, presenting a 
relatively low value compared with Sony S700 (relative utility is 0.206) and only a 
slightly better value compared with Canon A570 (relative utility is 0.013).  The 
relatively lower utility of Sony DSCW also indicates that it is less likely to be purchased 
after being considered along with other products in the choice set.  The results suggest 
that the two stages of product competition are particularly distinctive when the 
consideration set is fairly small.  While Sony DSCW does well for competition in 
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consideration, it does poorly for competition in choice. 
I conduct the above analysis for each group of substitute product alternatives.  
The summary of the estimations of consideration probabilities (D’s) and relative product 
utilities (B’s) are presented in Table 4.4.  I first depict the maximum likelihood 
estimation results of consideration probabilities for the 38,400 products from Equation 
(4.15) in Figure 4.3.  Figure 4.3 suggests that only around 1% of products have more 
than 50% probability of being considered by consumers in the market for related products.  
The statistics indicate a fierce product competition for shrunk consideration in online 
commerce, as a large number of products are rarely considered by most consumers.  On 
the other hand, the results also suggest relatively low level of competition based on 
product value as consumers consider few products in making purchase decisions.  
Figure 4.3 also addresses concerns about the influence of the Long Tail phenomenon.  
While online retailers have substantially increased product variety, the analysis indicates 
that that niche products continue to face serious obstacles as they are rarely considered by 
consumers. 
The scatter plot in Figure 4.4 illustrates the competition for consideration and for 
choice, represented by the values of consideration probabilities and product utilities, 
respectively, for 38,400 products.  The results also imply that, while many products 
present comparable capability in competing for consideration and for choice, there is a 
great amount of products that do well for consideration but not so well for purchase 
choice, and vice versa.  This demonstrates that there is a clear differentiation at the two 
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levels of product competition—competition for consideration and for choice. 
In the following discussions, I further uncover the factors that attribute to product 
competition in consideration stage and in choice stage respectively, given that the 
consideration set is fairly small. 
 
4.5.1 Effects of Consideration Probability and Product Utility on Purchase 
I first examine the role of product consideration probability in product 
competition.  Specifically, to observe the impact of consideration probability on ultimate 
product choice, in Figure 4.5 I re-plot Figure 4.3 to a histogram in which in x-axis, “Rank 
1” refers to the most-likely-purchased products in each product group, “Rank 2” refers to 
the second-most-likely-purchased products in each product group, etc.  Y-axis refers to 
the average consideration probability of the products in each rank.  Figure 4.5 shows 
that the most-likely- and the second-most-likely-purchased products present comparable 
average consideration probabilities, while the average consideration probabilities for 
products in Rank 3 and Rank 4 decrease significantly.  This reveals that there is a greater 
competition for being considered by consumers and that the consideration probability 
plays a critical role in resulting in greater variation in product purchases. 
Product utilities (B’s), however, present a different effect on purchase probability.  
To demonstrate the effect of product utility on product purchase and market share, I 
remove the influence of consideration probability by assuming that all products in a 
competing product group are considered by consumers.  Therefore, the probability of a 
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given product being purchased, according to Equation (4.16), is simply 
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Figure 4.6 presents the histogram of average purchase probability for each 
product rank, according to Equation (4.21).  From the figure, we can see that each 
product rank reveals very comparable average purchase probabilities.  This indicates 
that the competition for being chosen within the consideration set is little: product utility 
does not contribute much to the variation in purchases.  Compare Figure 4.6 with Figure 
4.5, we observe that the impact of consideration probability on product purchase is 
greater than that of product utility.  Specifically, the results indicate that consideration 
probability, rather than product utility, plays a more dominant role in leading to the 
variation in ultimate product choice and purchase.  On the other hand, product 
competition within the consideration set is rather limited.  In the following, I further 
separate the price effect from the quality effect within the consideration set on product 
purchases. 
 
4.5.2 Results of Price and Quality Effects on Product Competition 
As discussed earlier, the proposed methodology is further extended to separate the 
product quality effect (a’s) from price effect (b’s) for product utility estimation.  In 
particular, the consideration probabilities (D’s), quality effects (a’s) and price effect (b) 
are directly estimated from Equation (4.19).  Table 4.5 shows a small example of the 
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four digital cameras, with a’s and b estimated, representing product quality and price 
parameters respectively. 
The separation of quality effect from price effect allows for a further investigation 
of the effect of product utility on purchase.  To examine the quality effect, I control for 
the price effect by assuming that the prices remain the same across all products in a 
competing product group.  Therefore, the effect of product utility on purchase will 
solely depend on the product quality.  I show in Figure 4.7 the histogram of average 
purchase probability (based on product quality) for each product rank.  The figure shows 
that, controlling for price effect, each product rank has very comparable average purchase 
probabilities.  This indicates that product quality, within the consideration set, plays a 
rather limited role in affecting product purchases. 
The analysis decomposes the factors that would result in the variation of product 
purchase probabilities, including consideration probability, product utility, and quality 
effect.  The empirical results show that in online retailers in which the consideration set 
may shrink with the presence of online recommendations, there becomes more significant 
competition for being considered by consumers than being chosen from the consideration 
set. 
 
4.5.3 Demand Estimation 
The parameters, including consideration probability and product utility as a 
function of quality effect (a’s) and price effect (b’s), are further used for demand 
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estimation, according to Equations (4.17) to (4.20).  Figure 4.8 presents the distribution 
of demands for products estimated from consideration probability and product utility.  
The results show that less than 10% of the products have the values for demand above 0.1, 
while over 90% of the products show the values for demand below 0.1.  Specifically, in 
this figure to the right is the “Long Tail,” and to the left are the very few products that 
dominate the demands. 
 
4.5.4 Decomposition of Product Competition 
To summarize, to understand the structure of product competition in online 
commerce due to the shrinkage of consideration set, I decompose the competition on 
three dimensions.  First, products differ in their propensity of being considered by a 
consumer.  Second, products differ in their inherent quality.  And third, products differ 
in their prices.  The three dimensions show important implications for companies by 
corresponding to a firm’s advertising, quality and price strategy respectively.  To assess 
the influence of each dimension, I isolate the influence of the other two dimensions.  
First, I assess the influence of consideration on product competition by estimating the 
probability of each product being considered by a consumer.  Figure 4.5 presents the 
result.  Second, I assess the influence of product utility by estimating the probability of 
each product’s being purchased under the assumption that every consumer considers all 
products in a production competition group.  This approach allows us to remove the 
influence of variations in consideration probability and focus on the influence of product 
 78
utility.  Figure 4.6 presents the result.  Finally, I assess the influence of product quality 
by estimating the probability of each product’s being purchased under the assumption that 
every consumer considers all products in a product competition group and that all 
products are offered at the same price.  This approach allows us to remove the influence 
of consideration effect and the influence of price effect.   Figure 4.7 presents the results.  
In Figure 4.9, I put the three histograms of probabilities side-by-side.  The results 
indicate that when consideration set is small, consumer consideration plays a significant 
role in driving up heterogeneity in product demands.  The average purchase 
probabilities for each product rank estimated from product utility and quality, on the other 
hand, do not vary significantly. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this study, I show that the sizes of consideration sets of online consumers are 
fairly small, evidence from real-world business data of Amazon.com.  The possible 
occurrences of shrunk consideration sets in online retailers have significant implications 
for online product competition. 
Specifically, I analyze product competition for limited consideration by 
consumers and for choice within consideration sets in online retailers.  I find that despite 
the large number of product varieties provided by online retailers, most consumers 
consider fewer than two products in making purchase decisions due to the presence and 
reinforcement of online recommendations.  As a result, there is very limited competition 
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within a consumer’s consideration set.  Changes to product quality and price therefore 
have little influence on consumer demand.  On the other hand, the analysis shows that 
majority of variations in product demand is due to differences in products’ propensity of 
being considered.  This suggests that competition for consumer consideration plays a 
dominant role in online product competition. 
The findings have significant implications for firms’ product, price and marketing 
strategies for online retailing.  Contrary to the convention wisdom that the Internet 
significantly broadens consumers’ product knowledge and access to product specific 
information, the findings indicate that increasing consumer product awareness remains to 
be the most important task for firms, while pricing and product positioning strategies 
have more limited value to product competition. 
By developing a model to measure product competition using only publicly 
available aggregate purchase statistics of consumers provided by online retailers, I also 
contribute to the literature from a methodological perspective.  While prior two-stage 
consideration choice model requires micro-level data that is usually not available to firms, 
I show that the model can be identified using only aggregated information in online 
markets.  This is particularly important for electronic commerce research given that 
micro level transactions are not generally accessible.  I also extend the model to panel 
data setting, thus enabling price effect to be separated from quality effect in the analysis. 
This research also provides unique contributions to practice.  The findings in this 
study imply the importance of effective and differentiated marketing strategies for online 
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retailing.  In particular, the results show that product competition for consideration in 
online retailers may be fiercer than that for choice.  Therefore, products competing for 
consideration and for choice will require different marketing efforts made by product 
manufacturers.  For example, while improving product-specific quality and functionality 
has long been acknowledged as the core for manufactures, it is suggested that increasing 
brand awareness to consumers with more sophisticated advertising skills may be even 
more critical for online commerce. 
This study has a number of limitations.  Since the consideration process of 
consumers is not directly observable in online retailers, in the proposed model I assume 
that a product’s probability of being considered is independent from other products.  
Second, my methodology can only be applied to substitute products but not to 
complementary products.  Complementary consumption requires different concerns 
about consumers’ consideration and choice (Gentzkow 2007), and the issues are not 
covered in this study. 
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Appendices 
Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2.1 Information Economic Rationale of Information Seeking 
Consider an example of stock message boards in which online investors view and 
share investment information.  Let s denote the true state of an investment in a certain 
stock.  For explanation purpose, I assume there are two states, { }21 , sss∈ , representing s 
is either a positive or a negative state.  Notice that the model can be easily extended to 
the situation in which there is a finite set with states more than two.  Each online 
investor i is endowed with a noisy signal is about the true state.  Let ip be the probability 
of observing the true state by individual i, i.e. the accuracy of his/her signal.  We then 
have 
ii
ii
psss
psss
−=≠
==
1]|)Pr[(
]|)Pr[( , 
where { }21 , sss∈ and 2
1>ip  (i.e. all investors are at least weakly informed.) 
Each online investor’s endowed information set can be specified as },{ ii ps , 
where is is the signal he/she observes and ip is the probability that he/she observes the true 
state.  Assume the correct decision yields a payoff of α while the incorrect decision 
leads to a loss of α.  The objective of the investor is to make an investment that 
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maximizes his/her expected payoff EU : 
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 (2.1.1) 
Equation (2.1.1) accounts for four scenarios in which the investor’s observation is 
the same as the true state ( 1s or 2s ) or the investor’s observation is different from the true 
state ( 1s or 2s ).  It suggests that, without additional information, an investor invests 
according to his/her signal as long as his/her accuracy level is above 50 percent.  Virtual 
investment communities allow the investor to improve his/her decision by interacting 
with others and obtain their information. 
I consider an individual arriving at a virtual investment community and observing 
messages from others.  Messages arrive sequentially and the individual considers one 
message at a time.  Each message is posted by another member with information 
set },{ jj ps .  In online communities, while the signal of a message is easily observable, 
its accuracy is more difficult to assess.  It requires the individual to click through the 
message and often to interact with the person who posted this message.  To model this 
feature, I assume that it is free for an individual to observe the signal of a message but 
he/she needs to incur a cost c to obtain its accuracy through interactions with the other 
investors.  I show below that information economics predicts that the individual has 
more incentive to interact with investors with opposite opinions than those sharing the 
same opinion of a stock. 
To see the result, I start with a simpler case where the individual observes both the 
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signal js and the accuracy jp  of a message.  A rational investor will make inference of 
the true state using Bayes rule based on the message as well as his/her own signal.  If 
the observed signal from virtual investment communities is the same as the investor’s 
own signal, then the probability that the signal observed by investor i represents the true 
state is: 
[ ] ( ) ( )( ).11)]()Pr[( Pr]|)Pr[()(| jiji jiji jiji pppp
pp
ssss
ssssss
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=∩===∩=  (2.1.2) 
On the other hand, if the observed signal from virtual investment communities is 
different from the investor’s own signal, then the probability that the signal represents the 
true state is:  
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 (2.1.3) 
Given the inference, it is straightforward to show the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1.  An investor endowed with information set },{ ii ps makes the following 
investment decisions upon observing a message with signal js and accuracy jp : 
(1) Invest based on his/her own signal if the signal of the message is the 
same as the signal of his/her own. 
(2) Invest based on his/her own signal if the signal of the message differs 
from his/her own signal and the strength of the message is weaker.   
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(3) Invest against his/her own signal if the signal of the message differs 
from his/her own signal and the strength of message is stronger.   
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
(1) Invest based on his/her own signal if the signal of the message is the same as the 
signal of his/her own signal. 
Proof.  If the signal of message j is the same as investor i’s own signal, then the 
probability that the signal observed by investor i represents the true state is: 
[ ] ( )( ).11)(|1 jiji jiji pppp
pp
sssssPP −−+==∩==  (2.1.4) 
Since I assume that investors are at least weakly informed, that is, 21,21 >> ji pp , we 
have 
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The expected utility for investor i is 0)12( 1 >− αP .  Therefore, investor i will invest 
based on his/her own signal. 
 
(2) Invest based on his/her own signal if the signal of the message differs from his/her 
own signal and the strength of the message is weaker. 
Proof.  If the signal of message j is different from investor i’s own signal, then the 
probability that the signal observed by investor i represents the true state is: 
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Since I assume 21,21 >> ji pp , and if the strength of the message is weaker, that 
is, ji pp > , we have 
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The expected utility for investor i is 0)12( 2 <− αP .  Therefore, investor i will invest 
based on his/her own signal. 
 
(3) Invest against his/her own signal if the signal of the message differs from his/her own 
signal and the strength of message is stronger.   
Proof.  Similarly as the proof in (2), since I assume that 21,21 >> ji pp , and if the 
strength of the message is stronger, that is, ji pp < , we have 
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The expected utility for investor i is 0)12( 2 <− αP .  Therefore, investor i will invest 
against his/her own signal. 
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Lemma 1 indicates that when the signal from the message is the same as the 
investor’s own signal, an individual’s investment decision is the same regardless of the 
accuracy of the message.  However, when the two signals are different, the investment 
decision depends upon the accuracy of the message. 
I now consider the situation when online investors can readily observe a 
message’s signal but require extra cost c to identify its accuracy.  Lemma 1 indicates 
that when the signals are the same, there is no value for the investor to identify the 
accuracy of a message, since the additional information will not influence his/her 
decision.  However, when the signals are different, the investor has more incentive to 
identify the accuracy of the message: 
 
Proposition 1.  An investor endowed with information set },{ ii ps makes the following 
information seeking decisions upon observing a message with signal js and 
unknown jp with distribution f(p). 
(1) Seek no further information if the signal of the message is the same as 
the investor’s own signal. 
(2) Seek information on accuracy of the message if the signal of the 
message differs from the investor’s own signal and if the information 
seeking cost is not too high. 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove the result formally, I assume an individual has a prior belief of distribution jp as 
follows 
   0p  with probability q, 
   1p  with probability (1- q). 
If both 0p and 1p are smaller than ip , then Lemma 1 indicates that investor i always 
make the investment decision based on his/her own signal regardless of the realization 
of jp .  Therefore, there is no incentive for the investor to explore the accuracy of the 
message.  Similarly, if both 0p and 1p are greater than ip , investor i always makes the 
investment decision against his/her own signal regardless of the realization of jp , and 
there is no incentive for the investor to explore the accuracy of the message.  The only 
situation in which identifying the message accuracy matters to an investor is when the 
strength of his/her signal is between 0p and 1p . 
Without loss of generality, I assume 10 ppp i >> .  
Let ( ) )1(* 10 qpqppEp j −+== , the expected value of jp , then there are two cases.  The 
first case is when ipp >* .  If the investor does not click on the posting, then the 
probability of the investor making the correct decision is *p .  The value of information 
is therefore α)*( ipp − . On the other hand, if the investor clicks on the posting, the 
accuracy could be either 0p or 1p .  If 0p is found, the investor will invest based on what 
=jp
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the posting signal suggests, and the value of information is α)( 0 ipp − .  On the contrary, 
if 1p is found, the investor will make the decision based on her own signal, and the value 
of information is 0.  The expected value of knowing the realization of jp is 
therefore qpp i α)( 0 − .  The value of the click can be calculated as the difference 
between the value of knowing the realization of jp and the value of not knowing the 
realization, that is, 
0)1)(()*()( 10 >−−=−−− ααα qppppqpp iii . 
Given the cost of clicking, the net utility is .)1)(( 1 cqppi −−− α  
Likewise, for the second case in which ipp <* , I can show that the value of the 
click is calculated as 
0)(0)( 00 >−=−− qppqpp ii αα . 
Given the cost of clicking, the net utility is .)( 0 cqpp i −− α  
In sum, the proposition above suggests that economically rational individuals 
have more interests in exploring messages that contradict their belief to improve the 
quality of decision making. 
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Figure 2.1: A Discussion Thread Example (© 2007 Yahoo! Finance Message Board: 
MSFT) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Coded Sentiment Values in Yahoo! Finance Stock Message Boards 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Yahoo! Finance Stock Discussion Threads 
Stock 
Ticker 
Avg Daily 
Messages 
Avg Daily 
Tagged Threads
Sentiment 
Average 
Sentiment 
Standard Deviation
AA 54.43 6.70 0.90 1.27 
AXP 11.96 1.10 (0.83) 1.46 
BA 173.27 6.35 1.00 1.21 
C 36.95 2.99 0.72 1.41 
CAT 20.47 5.27 1.08 1.56 
DD 31.14 1.27 0.70 1.63 
DIS 53.08 5.54 0.42 1.61 
EK 9.53 1.81 (0.14) 1.46 
GE 351.14 19.27 0.89 1.47 
GM 264.60 54.29 (0.24) 1.80 
HD 37.44 7.83 0.74 1.66 
HON 13.44 0.63 0.82 1.40 
HPQ 263.72 7.31 0.05 1.47 
IBM 88.03 9.54 0.46 1.75 
INTC 234.92 89.71 0.24 1.81 
IP 12.29 1.38 0.49 1.36 
JNJ 23.75 3.84 1.00 1.31 
JPM 96.94 2.29 (0.42) 1.51 
KO 64.06 0.91 0.57 1.35 
MCD 23.17 1.28 0.42 1.56 
MMM 36.26 0.97 0.67 1.45 
MO 154.63 10.20 0.91 1.07 
MRK 98.60 4.99 0.35 1.62 
MSFT 552.60 34.44 (0.35) 1.59 
PG 20.49 3.00 1.00 1.17 
T 47.58 3.55 (0.07) 1.57 
UTX 12.77 2.69 0.83 1.22 
WMT 488.41 52.01 0.34 1.95 
XOM 102.77 12.67 0.81 1.82 
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Table 2.2: Community Fragmentation: Intra-thread Variation vs. Inter-thread 
Variation 
T-Tests 
Difference DF t Value 
Var(IntraThread) – Var(InterThread) 18000 -152.38∗∗∗ 
∗∗∗ p < .01 
 
Table 2.3: Effect of Opinion Distance on Individual Choice of Discussion Threads 
Variables MNL 
Estimate (Std. Err.) 
Hypotheses Supported 
 
H1A 
 
Yes 
 
Opinion Distance 
 
-0.4453 (0.0036)∗∗∗ 
H1B No 
 
# of Concurrent Threads 
 
-1.4601 (0.0143)∗∗∗   
# of Participants 
 
1.6952 (0.0138)∗∗∗   
Thread Position 
(linear term) 
 
-0.3030 (0.0068)∗∗∗   
Thread Position 
(quadratic term) 
 
-0.0049 (0.0008)∗∗∗   
Life Span 
 
-0.0004 (8.6E-6)∗∗∗   
Stock Volatility 
 
0.0380 (0.2271)   
Pseudo R-square 
 
60.13%   
Observations 72,019   
∗∗∗ p < .01 
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
 
Figure 3.1: Effects of Psychological and Economic Concerns on Opinion Distance 
and Resulting Thread Choices 
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Table 3.1: Variable Definitions for Individual Choice Model 
Variables Definitions 
Opinion Distance The absolute difference of the sentiment value of the investor 
and the average sentiment of all messages in a certain discussion 
thread. 
 
# of Concurrent 
Threads 
For a discussion thread, the total number of unique threads in a 
certain stock message board that have occurred within one-hour 
frame prior to the first message time of this thread. 
 
# of Participants For a discussion thread, the number of unique participants within 
this thread. 
 
Stock Volatility The monthly-based historical stock volatilities retrieved from 
CBOE. 
 
Opinion Status A dummy variable 1 indicates that the investor holds a minority 
opinion and 0 for a majority opinion on a stock.  Minority 
opinion is defined as if the sentiment of an investor differs from 
90% of his/her peers. 
 
Thread Position For a discussion thread in the choice set, the position relatively 
to other threads in reverse chronicle order when an investor 
arrives at the message board: 0 means the most recent and 9 
means the furthest thread. 
 
(linear term) Discussion threads with more recent positions are often more 
visible and accessible to the investors and thus are more likely to 
be selected. 
 
(quadratic term) To capture the fact that the probability that the earlier discussion 
threads are viewed and selected drops dramatically. 
 
Life Span The time in minute passed since the first message posting time in 
the discussion thread until the time an investor makes the choice 
of thread. 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics: Full Thread Choice Data in Yahoo! Finance 
Variable Mean (Std dev) Max Min 
Opinion Distance 1.359 (1.753) 4 0 
# of Concurrent Threads  5.586 (9.324) 201 1 
# of Participants 6.131 (7.427) 40 1 
Stock Volatility 22.014 (12.433) 111.469 6.247 
Opinion Status 0.265 (0.441) 1 0 
Life Span 890.606 (3789.990) 43179 1 
Total Observations: 72,019 
 
 
Table 3.3: Correlation Matrix of the Key Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Opinion Distance 1.00     
2 # of Current Threads 0.042 1.00    
3 # of Participants 0.044 0.509 1.00   
4 Stock Volatility 0.035 0.301 0.331 1.00  
5 Opinion Status 0.404 0.087 0.092 0.042 1.00 
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Table 3.4: Individual Choice of Discussion Threads: Full MNL Estimation Results 
 Estimates (Std. Err.) Hypotheses Supported 
Opinion Distance 
 
-0.5360 (0.0242)∗∗∗   
# of Concurrent Threads 
 
-1.3671 (0.0151)∗∗∗   
# of Participants 
 
1.5206 (0.0146)∗∗∗ H3A Yes 
# of Concurrent Threads 
× Opinion Distance 
 
-0.1635 (0.0066)∗∗∗ H1 Yes 
# of Participants 
× Opinion Distance 
 
0.3055 (0.0080)∗∗∗ H3B Yes 
Stock Volatility 
× Opinion Distance 
 
-0.0622 (0.0079)∗∗∗ H2A Yes 
Minority Status 
× Opinion Distance 
 
-0.0834 (0.0074)∗∗∗ H2B Yes 
Control Variables    
Thread Position 
(linear term) 
 
-0.3002 (0.0068)∗∗∗   
Thread Position 
(quadratic term) 
 
-0.0043 (0.0007)∗∗∗   
Life Span 
 
-0.0004 (8.6E-6)∗∗∗   
Stock Volatility 
 
0.1087 (0.2296)   
Opinion Status 
 
0.0787 (0.000)   
Pseudo R-square 
 
60.53%   
Observations 72,019   
∗∗∗ p < .01 
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Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
Figure 4.1: An Example of “What Do Customers Ultimately Buy After Viewing 
This Item?” on Amazon.com 
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of Probabilities of Different Consideration Set Sizes 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Consideration Probabilities 
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Figure 4.4: Scatter Plot of Consideration Probabilities vs. Product Utilities 
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Figure 4.5: Average Consideration Probability for Each Product Rank 
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Figure 4.6: Average Purchase Probability (from Product Utility) for Each Product 
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Figure 4.7: Average Purchase Probability (from Product Quality) for Each Product 
Rank 
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Figure 4.8: Estimated Demand Distribution 
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Figure 4.9: Side-By-Side Comparison of Average Probabilities from Product 
Consideration, Product Utility and Product Quality 
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Table 4.1: The Conditional Probabilities of Buying “Row” Products Given Having 
Considered “Column” Products 
Percentage Sony S700 Sony DSCW Canon A570 Canon A560 
Sony S700 66% 17% 7% 6% 
Sony DSCW 7% 78% 5% 0.5% 
Canon A570 0.5% 0.5% 81% 7% 
Canon A560 0.5% 0.5% 25% 66% 
 
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Data 
Variable Observation Mean Std dev Min Max 
 Period 1 
Sales Rank 38,400 345.49 3,337.75 1 249,242
Sale Price 38,400 116.40 209.59 0.01 2,799.77
Rank 1 Purchase 
Propensity (C1) 
38,400 69.90% 0.14 25% 99% 
Rank 2 Purchase 
Propensity (C2) 
38,400 12.28% 0.11 0.5% 45% 
Rank 3 Purchase 
Propensity (C3) 
38,400 5.42% 0.05 0.5% 32% 
Rank 4 Purchase 
Propensity (C4) 
38,400 3.28% 0.03 0.5% 17% 
 Period 2 
Sales Rank 38,400 356.11 2817.74 1 152,754
Sale Price 38,400 118.43 223.45 0.01 2,599.00
Rank 1 Purchase 
Propensity (C1) 
38,400 70.17% 0.14 27% 99% 
Rank 2 Purchase 
Propensity (C2) 
38,400 12.27% 0.11 0.5% 45% 
Rank 3 Purchase 
Propensity (C3) 
38,400 5.43% 0.05 0.5% 33% 
Rank 4 Purchase 
Propensity (C4) 
38,400 3.37% 0.04 0.5% 20% 
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Table 4.3: Estimation Results of A Sample Product Group 
Parameters Estimates (std err) 
Consideration Probabilities  
DSony S700 0.126 (0.051)∗∗ 
DSony DSCW 0.580 (0.140)∗∗ 
DCanon A570 0.060 (0.024)∗∗ 
DCanon A560 0.020 (0.007)∗∗ 
Product Utilities  
BSony S700 0.206 (0.011)∗∗ 
BSony DSCW 0.055 (0.002)∗∗ 
BCanon A570 0.013 (0.008)∗∗ 
BCanon A560 0 
∗∗: p < .05 
 
Table 4.4: Summary of Estimations of Consideration Probability and Product 
Utility 
Parameter Mean Std dev Min Max 
Consideration Probability (Di) 0.184 0.156 0.004 0.950 
Relative Product Utility (Bi) 0.279 0.151 0.001 0.942 
 
Table 4.5: Estimation of a’s and b For Product Utility: An Example of Digital 
Cameras 
  MLE Estimates (std err) 
Product Product Utility (B) A B 
Sony S700 0.265 0.301 (0.0023)∗∗ 
Sony DSCW 0.091 0.125 (0.0014)∗∗ 
Canon A570 0.094 0.186 (0.0012)∗∗ 
Canon A560 0.006 0.089 (0.0036)∗∗ 
 
 
0.0004 (0.00012)∗∗
∗∗: p < .05 
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